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ABSTRACT
The monetary powers embedded in the U.S. Constitution were revolutionary and led to a watershed
transformation in the nation's monetary structure. They included determining what monies could be
legal tender, who could emit fiat paper money, and who could incorporate banks. How the debate
at the 1787 Constitutional Convention over these powers evolved and led the Founding Fathers to
the specific powers adopted is presented and deconstructed. Why they took this path rather than
replicate the successful colonial system and why they codified such powers into supreme law rather










The U.S. Constitution and Monetary Powers: 
An Analysis of the 1787 Constitutional Convention and   
And How a Constitutional Transformation of  
The Nation’s Monetary System Emerged* 
 
In 1787, just over three years after the Treaty of Paris recognized U.S. 
independence, the founding fathers met from May 25th through September 17th in 
Philadelphia to craft a new national constitution to replace the Articles of Confederation.
1  
This new U.S. Constitution, ratified by the states and then adopted by Congress in 1789, 
profoundly altered the nation’s monetary structure. It was nothing short of revolutionary 
(Ferguson 1983, 404-405). Before the U.S. Constitution, the principal “inside” paper 
money in circulation was issued directly by government legislatures and backed not by 
specie (the “outside” money of the times) but by the issuing government’s future taxes.
2  
Very few banks existed—none before 1782 and only three by 1787. After the U.S. 
Constitution, governments were prohibited from issuing paper money. Instead, 
government chartered, but privately run and largely unregulated, banks proliferated—
numbering 76 by 1805—and filled the inside paper money void by issuing banknotes 
backed by fractional reserves in specie. By banning the chief alternative competitor, the 
U.S. Constitution established the legal framework that allowed for the ascendance in the 
U.S. of the modern bank-based financial system. 
The constitutional monetary powers of interest are defined here as 1) the power to 
emit bills of credit—paper money, 2) the power to determine what money is legal tender, 
and 3) the power to charter banks. These powers focus on restructuring the means of 
payment in society by circumscribing the money supply. The Constitution did not 




the nation. Post-Constitution, a plethora of different private banknotes and specie coins in 
different foreign measurement units circulated as currency. The Constitution at best 
circumscribed the medium of exchange to being specie and specie-linked paper 
substitutes. A common monetary unit of account—the U.S. Dollar—would emerge as a 
by-product of the market’s optimal transactions-cost adjustment to the restructured means 
of payment brought about by the Constitution.
3 
At the Constitutional Convention the founding fathers decided by explicit vote not 
to include the power to emit bills of credit and (debatably) not to include the power to 
charter banks among the powers granted to the national government.
4  They decided to 
prohibit individual states absolutely from emitting bills of credit and from having power 
to determine what could be legal tender, i.e. Article 1, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution 
states, “No State shall…coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and 
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts…” Finally, the founding fathers did not take 
away the power to charter banks from the states. These decisions embedded in simple 
Constitutional clauses and Convention votes radically transformed the nation’s monetary 
structure.  
These decisions, however, did not emerge until rather late in the Convention’s 
deliberations. What emerged was not an obvious choice before or up through the first half 
of the Convention. Thus, these decisions were not only revolutionary in their impact but 
arguably were somewhat unexpected. Why mid-Convention did the founding fathers shift 
gears and opt for something both new and radically different from what went before? 
Colonial America had experienced stable fiat paper money regimes (Ferguson 1969, 249; 




system? How did they go from a quarter-century experience of stable paper money 
regimes before the Revolution to a total Constitutional ban on paper money at all levels 
of government after 1787? The evolution of the debates and decisions at the Convention 
may be important to our understanding of what emerged. And because of what emerged, 
these debates may also be informative of larger political economy issues that are still 
studied today regarding the role of money creation in financing wars, the costs and 
benefits of public versus private inside money supply systems and, given a private inside 
money supply system, what degree of political independence these suppliers should be 
granted and whether they should be regulated. 
The primary purpose of the analysis that follows is to trace and deconstruct the 
“what” and “how” of this dramatic, constitutionally manufactured transformation of 
governmental monetary powers as they evolved during the Constitutional Convention.
5  
These powers were not a reason why the Convention was called. They were not issues at 
the 1785 Mount Vernon Conference or at the 1786 Annapolis Convention, nor were they 
issues in the numerous amendments to the Articles of Confederation from 1781 through 
1786 (Grubb 2003, 1789; Jensen I, 140-229; Rutland II, 814-822). The primary reasons 
given for calling the Convention were to solve trade and navigation disputes between the 
states and to secure an independent source of tax revenue for the national government. By 
giving the national government independent power to raise tax revenue and regulate trade 
between the states, the structural allocation of power among the states within the national 
government became a paramount concern and occupied most of the Convention’s time. 




excesses of democracy, became one of the prominent subtexts of the Convention 
(Ferguson 1969; 1983). 
The analysis begins with Section I establishing the monetary and economic 
conditions leading into the Convention to determine what economic problems and 
monetary conditions the founding fathers faced. The key economic problems were trade 
depression, price deflation, and acute specie scarcity, and the key monetary problem was 
the extensive use of legal tender laws by the states.  
Sections II through VI trace the evolution of monetary powers considered and 
arguments offered by the delegates chronologically through the Convention from its 
beginning on May 29th to its conclusion on September 17th. Several important theses 
emerge here. First, replicating the colonial monetary system appears to be the initial tack 
taken at the Convention. The monetary powers actually adopted do not emerge until quite 
late at the Convention. Second, a pervasive, escalating, and perhaps intentional conflation 
of legal tender problems with emitting paper money per se takes place in Convention 
rhetoric. Third, while not in the written Constitution, the Convention voted to disallow 
federally issued paper money. Fourth, the Convention appeared also to disallow federally 
chartered banks. Fifth, the post-Convention controversy over a federally chartered bank 
was not about the application of the Constitution’s implied-powers clause. 
Finally, Sections VII-VIII use the foregoing analysis to evaluate why the 
founding fathers acted as they did regarding the monetary powers put into the 
Constitution. Many of the common arguments in the literature are dismissed as 




offered dealing with creating a specie reservoir in society. The outline of the analysis is 
as follows: 
I. The American Monetary Regime Leading into the Constitutional Convention, 
1750-1787 
   A. Colonial Legislature-issued Tax-backed Fiat Paper Money Regimes and Their 
 Regulatory Constraints 
   B. The Revolution and Paper Money 
   C. The Economy and State Paper Money between the Treaty of Paris and the Adoption  
  of the Constitution 
   D. The Problem of Legal Tender Laws versus Paper Money Emissions Per Se 
   E. Did the Founding Fathers Distinguish Between Legal Tender Laws and Paper  
  Money Per Se?   
II. The Beginnings—May 29 to July 26: The Virginia Plan, its Modifications, and  
 Rivals 
   A. The Randolph Opening 
   B. In the Shadows—The Pinckney Plan 
   C. Debating and Amending the Virginia Plan—May 30th through July 26th 
III. Paper Money Riot Interlude? 
IV. The Committee of Detail—July 27 to Aug. 6: The Initial Restructuring of  
 Monetary  Powers 
V. The End Game—Aug. 6 to 28: The Absolute Constitutional Proscription of  
 Monetary  Powers 




   B. The Absolute Prohibition on Paper Money Issued by State Governments 
VI. National Banking as a Substitute Monetary Power?—Aug. 28 to Sept. 14 
   A. Who Shall Have the Power to Charter Banks? 
   B. The Post-Convention Constitutional Controversy over Who Can Charter Banks  
VII. Why Did They Do It? 
   A. Rent-Seeking Bankers? 
   B. Big Tents, Polarization, Insider Speculation, and Income/Debt Redistribution  
  Schemes?    
   C. Creating a Specie Reservoir in Society for the Merchant Community Involved in  




I. The American Monetary Regime Leading into the Constitutional Convention, 
1750-1787 
A. Colonial Legislature-issued Tax-backed Fiat Paper Money Regimes and Their  
Regulatory Constraints 
  The British North American colonies were the first modern western economies to 
experiment with large-scale government issuances of fiat paper money. Colonial 
legislatures directly issued bills of credit to pay for their government’s expenses and as 
mortgage loans to subjects who pledged their lands as collateral. These bills were not 
government bonds. Typically, they earned no interest, came in small denominations, 
circulated at market-determined rates of exchange to specie and the paper monies of other 
colonies, and were accepted by the issuing government in payment of that government’s 




specie nor entered the market at their discretion to buy and sell their paper money for 
specie to defend a fixed exchange rate. These bills circulated inside, but seldom outside, 
the colony of issue as cash alongside specie monies, which only entered and exited the 
colony through merchant foreign trade and government transfers. Payments to parties 
outside the colony were typically in specie units. By the middle of the 18th century, these 
bills comprised a substantial portion of the money supply within their respective colonies. 
Colonial legislatures backed their paper money by linking it not to specie but to future 
taxes and mortgage payments designed to withdraw it from circulation in a timely 
fashion. Upon redemption, it was burned. Each colony maintained the market value of its 
paper money through its timely injection and then redemption, thereby controlling the 
quantity of paper money in circulation. The presence of competitive currency substitutes 
(specie) constrained colonies to follow a stable path with regard to the relative value of 
their inside paper monies (Brock; Ferguson 1969, 249; 1983, 399, 404; Grubb 2003, 
2004, 2005a; Perkins; Priest; Smith 1985).   
  The British government extended the Bubble Act to the colonies in 1741—
effectively eliminating banks—and imposed regulations on paper money with the 
Currency Acts of 1751 and 1764. The Currency Acts allowed the colonies to emit paper 
money as long as it met two requirements, namely 1) that it not be made a legal tender 
and 2) that ample taxes be put in place to redeem each issue in a reasonable time. Some 
colonies had instituted such policies on their own accord long before these regulations 
were passed. After 1748, unlike most other colonies, Massachusetts renounced paper 
money and returned to the specie standard for the rest of the colonial period. While paper 




for the issuing government’s taxes and so it became a de facto legal tender for public 
debts in the issuing government’s jurisdiction. This in turn provided the anchor that 
allowed the bills to circulate as cash within that colony. By 1750 colonial legislatures had 
learned, for the most part, how to handle their tax-backed paper money regimes. This 
colonial monetary system produced remarkable long-run stability in terms of low 
inflation rates and stationarity in prices, exchange rates, and purchasing power parity 
(Behrens; Bordo and Marcotte; Brock; Ferguson 1969, 249; 1983, 399, 404; Grubb 2003, 
2004, 2005b; Perkins; Pickering XX, 306-309; Priest; Smith 1985).  
   The two regulatory pillars that made this colonial monetary system work were 1) 
that paper money could not be made a legal tender (other than for paying taxes levied by 
the issuing government), and 2) that the issuing government credibly commit, by enacting 
taxing policies concurrent with issuing said paper money, to redeeming its paper money 
in a timely fashion. Most of the founder fathers had lived and prospered as adults under 
this regulatory system.  
B. The Revolution and Paper Money 
  This system continued through the Revolution. Under the Articles of 
Confederation both individual states and the Continental Congress issued their own tax-
backed paper money. Beginning in 1775 the Continental Congress issued bills of credit—
Continental dollars—that depreciated to near zero and ceased to circulate after April 1781 
(Bezanson 1951; Calomiris; Rockoff 14-42). Without the power to levy its own taxes, 
Congress under the Articles of Confederation could not credibly commit to redeeming its 
bills of credit. This structural flaw along with the exigencies of wartime finance and 




the monetary troubles behind the Continental dollar, not just the emission of paper money 
per se. The Treaty of Paris resolved the issue of legitimacy and wartime financial 
pressure. And one of the primary goals of the 1787 Constitutional Convention was to 
correct the structural flaw by giving the national government an independent source of 
revenue by granting it the direct power of taxation. This in turn would let Congress 
credibly commit to redeeming its bills of credit and so potentially solve the national 
government’s paper money problems.  
Each of the 13 colony/states also issued its own paper money during the 
Revolution that, while depreciating, held its value to a greater extent than did the 
Continental dollar, in part because states had the power to tax and so could credibly back 
their currencies. The overwhelming cost of financing the war and the net specie export 
drain caused by wartime trade disruptions swamped their ability to fully tax-back their 
currencies and prevented their currencies from holding at par with specie (Nettels 1-44). 
C. The Economy and State Paper Money between the Treaty of Paris and the Adoption of 
the Constitution 
After the collapse of the Continental dollar in 1781, the national government did 
not return to issuing fiat paper money. While all states had issued paper money during the 
Revolution, new issues were rarer post-Revolution. Within three years of signing the 
Treaty of Paris, 7 of the 13 states—Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and South Carolina in 
1785; Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, and Georgia in 1786—returned to issuing 
new amounts of their own paper money usable, as during the colonial period, to pay taxes 
levied and land mortgages held by the issuing state. State legislatures in Virginia, 




new bills of credit (Grubb 2003; Holton 2005a, 198). States were considering such 
measures because of the substantial post-Revolution trade depression that devastated their 
economies between 1782 and 1790. The problem facing the U.S. and the founding fathers 
in the half decade leading up to the Constitutional Convention was not inflation, but 
deflation, and serious deflation at that, caused by a temporary but sharp and substantial 
trade deficit that drained foreign reserves (specie) out of the economy (Holton 2005b; 
Nettels 45-64, 105).     
Some founding fathers wrote as if they knew this. James Wilson, Convention 
delegate from Pennsylvania and a major architect of the monetary powers adopted at the 
Convention, explained in 1785: 
The disagreeable state of our commerce has been the effect of extravagant and 
injudicious importation. …When hostilities ceased, the floodgates of commerce 
were opened; and an inundation of foreign manufactures overflowed the United 
States: we seemed to have forgot, that to pay was as necessary in trade as to 
purchase; and we observed no proportion between our imports, and our produce 
and other natural means of remittance. What was the consequence? Those who 
made any payments [to foreigners] made them chiefly in specie; and in that way 
diminished our circulation (Adams 145). 
 
Likewise, James Madison, Convention delegate from Virginia and one of the major 
architects of the overall Constitution, remarked in a letter to Thomas Jefferson dated 
March 18, 1786 that: 
Another unhappy effect of a continuance of the present anarchy of our commerce, 
will be a continuance of the unfavorable balance on it, which by draining us our 
metals furnishes pretexts for the pernicious substitution of paper money, for 
indulgences to debtors, for postponement of taxes. In fact most of our political 
evils may be traced up to our commerce ones,... The lessons which the 
merchantile interest of Europe have received from late experience will probably 
check their propensity to credit us beyond our resources, and so far the evil of an 
unfavorable balance will correct itself. But the merchants of G.B. [Great Britain] 
if no others will continue to credit us at least as far as our remittances can be 
strained, and that is far enough to perpetuate our difficulties unless luxurious 




presents the proposed Convention as a remedial experiment which ought to 
command every assent… The price of our Staple is down….[and the] price has 
notwithstanding been falling ever since. … The scarcity of money must of 
necessary sink the price of every article (Rutland 1973 VIII, 502-503). 
  
Alexander Hamilton, Convention delegate from New York and another of the 
major architects of the nation’s monetary powers, from 1781 through 1790 frequently 
alluded to the scarcity of specie in circulation in the U.S. and fretted over ways to correct 
this scarcity by creating a money that was a near-perfect substitute for specie but also was 
not prone to the same problem as specie, namely temporary shortages caused by trade 
shocks that sent specie (or its perfect substitutes) out of the country (Syrett II, 618-619; 
III, 104, 175; VI, 71-72). Finally Gouverneur Morris, Convention delegate from 
Pennsylvania and a major architect of the monetary powers adopted at the Convention, 
observed during the Convention that “For a long time the people of America will not 
have money [meaning specie] to pay direct taxes” (Farrand II, 307). Similar statements 
indicating an awareness of this economic situation appeared in the popular press and 
writings of other prominent people (Holton 2005b).  
Price indices also show that from the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783 
through the adoption of the U.S. Constitution in 1789 the U.S. suffered significant price 
deflation (Grubb 2003, 1782-1783). For example, the Philadelphia price index fell 18 
percent, the Charleston, South Carolina, price index fell 20 percent, and the New York 
City price index fell at least 6 percent (Bezanson 1936, 392; Cole 121-122, 156). Price 
indices were denominated in their respective state paper currencies. When prices are 
declining, the currency is appreciating, namely more real goods can be purchased with a 




fathers and most scholarship to this day says that state paper money was depreciating in 
this period. How is that possible given price deflation?  
The answer is that when contemporaries talked about the value of state paper 
money it was not in terms of the real goods that it could purchase but in terms of how 
much specie (foreign exchange) it could buy. State paper money appreciating in terms of 
real goods but depreciating in terms in specie implies that specie was getting increasingly 
scarce relative both to goods and paper money. This is consistent with a massive short-
run unexpected trade deficit temporarily draining specie overseas. In other words, the 
specie price of goods in the U.S. between 1783 and 1789 (if we had such data) must have 
been falling even faster than the paper money price of goods. The implication is that to 
have an “undepreciating” paper currency in terms of specie in this period would have 
necessitated an even greater price deflation and so an even deeper recession than what 
occurred. The problem was not with state paper money per se, but with foreign trade and 
specie. In fact, the states that stepped in to issue paper money post-Revolution can be 
seen as trying to stem the price collapse due to the collapse of the specie money supply 
by providing temporary needed liquidity to support at least domestic exchange (Holton 
2005b).  
The key difference between the colonial system and this latter state system of 
paper money, with a few notable exceptions, was the extensive use of legal tender laws. 
This was caused by the exigencies of wartime finance (inflationary pressures caused by 
excessive emission of paper money relative to the taxing base), its immediate aftermath 
(immediate post-war pressures to quickly service this war debt), and the trade recession 




Legal tender laws were price controls, and wars and their immediate aftermath have often 
necessitated some type of price-control exercise (Rockoff). 
D. The Problem of Legal Tender Laws versus Paper Money Emissions per se 
  The legal profession’s definition of “legal tender”—that a person can be 
compelled via legal sanctions to accept particular monies in payment of debt—is largely 
irrelevant in terms of the economic impact of tender laws if said monies are competitively 
priced in the marketplace. Under such conditions the receiver is indifferent between 
accepting said money and any other market equivalent value (sans the minor issue of 
transacting costs). The receiver would just proceed to the market and exchange his legal 
tender money for what was contracted for or really desired in the initial exchange with 
little loss of value.  
Legal tender laws have economic impact when the said tender is not 
competitively priced in the marketplace, typically due to government imposed price or 
exchange rate controls that artificially peg the value of the tender above its market value. 
To distinguish this condition from the legal profession’s generic understanding of legal 
tender, it will be called here “binding legal tender.” Under such conditions a person 
legally compelled to receive the tender in payment of a debt receives less than its market 
equivalent in other goods or monies. As such, this person is no longer indifferent between 
receiving the tender and receiving payment in an alternative form or in what was initially 
contracted as payment—preferring the alternative to the legal tender. It is the binding 
legal tender problem that the founding fathers faced.  
In the Colonial and early Republican periods legal tender laws implied binding 




Spanish dollars or pounds sterling, e.g. 1.33 Maryland pounds being par to one pounds-
sterling (McCusker; Smith 1985). The par rate was the rate at which the issuing 
government typically committed to receiving its paper money in payment of its taxes. 
Without a legal tender law, the rate of exchange in the marketplace could vary from the 
par rate, and thus little damage to contracting would occur in that real transaction values 
would be equivalently priced across different monies. If, however, the issuing 
government declared its paper money to be a legal tender for all debts, then the pressure 
was to accept it at its par rating to its specie counterpart. Because this legal expedient was 
typically used during wartime emergencies and/or periods when a temporary unexpected 
dearth of specie forced paper money to depreciate in terms of how much specie it could 
buy, it meant being legally forced to accept paper money at considerably more than its 
market-determined value in specie. This was a form of price or exchange rate control. 
The Revolution might not have been successfully fought and financed without some 
product price, currency price, and/or exchange rate control (Farrand II, 309; Rockoff). 
Such controls, however, could only function as short-run stopgap measures. They could 
not be successful for very long. Many of the founding fathers wrote as if they understood 
this—namely that legal tender laws were a separate issue from paper money emissions 
per se (see Section I. E. below). 
  The financial pressures in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution led several 
states to declare their new paper money to be a binding legal tender with Rhode Island 
being the most notorious (Bishop; Holton 2004). Rhode Island will be used to illustrate 
important features of the post-Revolution finance problem. Like many states, Rhode 




the state’s near-term tax revenue capacity. The result was depreciation of both 
instruments. The risk of the state defaulting on its bonds, and the immediate post-war 
depression allowed some wealthy merchants to buy up these bonds at a price far below 
their specie face value, such as at 8 to 1. After having bought up these bonds at huge 
discounts, these same people in their position as, or influence over, state legislators were 
suspected of being the force behind getting the state to raise taxes in specie substantially 
so that the state could pay off the bonds at face value in specie. The proposed increase in 
specie taxes, in a depressed economy with little specie inflow due to trade disruptions, 
threatened to bankrupt many Rhode Island citizens and force them to sell off their 
property at fire-sale prices, thus further enriching those with resources and credit to buy. 
  Rhode Island voters stopped this suspected “insider-trading” speculative scheme 
through defeating those involved at the polls. This was an example of the “excesses” of 
democracy that some Federalists carped about. The new legislators ended the potential 
for any such scheme in the future through a new paper money emission in 1786. This 
emission was made a legal tender specifically for the purpose of forcing holders of Rhode 
Island war bonds to exchange them at face value for this new paper money. Given that 
the fiscal capacity of the state had not yet recovered, the taxing provisions in place were 
not sufficient to support this new paper money and so it also depreciated, though not 
necessarily below the market price of the war bonds. Merchant-speculators in war bonds 
who were seeking a payoff in specie from the state so they could cover payments outside 
the state were suddenly forced to take that state’s inside paper money at par. In the 
marketplace they could not convert this paper money into specie at the same war bond 




Much of the rhetoric at the time of the Convention (and even to this day) that 
singled out Rhode Island as the poster-child for irresponsible state management of paper 
money was written by the side that had its insider-trading get-rich speculation scheme 
dashed by the “excess” of democracy in Rhode Island. Something similar to this scheme 
was likely tried in Massachusetts with Shay’s Rebellion being its major outcome. As 
shown throughout the rest of the study below, many of the founding fathers wrote as if 
they knew and understood that the core problems were short-term war finance, post-war 
trade depression, and the resulting binding legal tender laws, and not paper money per se 
(see also Bishop; Farrand II, 307, III, 214-215; Grubb 2003, 1789-1790; Holton 2004; 
Jensen III, 301-302; Perkins). 
E. Did the Founding Fathers Distinguish Between Legal Tender Laws and Paper Money 
per se?   
The founding fathers wrote as if they understood the difference between binding 
legal tender laws and the emission of paper money per se. Most had lived and 
commercially prospered before the Revolution under colonial paper money regimes. For 
them to have been unaware of British regulations regarding legal tender status versus 
paper money per se would seem unlikely. In addition, this awareness can be seen in their 
writings. Roger Sherman, Convention delegate from Connecticut, writing as far back as 
1752, and Peyton Randolph, uncle and role model to Edmund Randolph, Convention 
delegate from Virginia, writing as far back as 1759, recognized the difference between 
binding legal tender laws and the emissions of paper money per se (Bradford 22, 166; 




The distinction between binding legal tender laws and the emission of paper 
money per se was also made by many founding fathers shortly before the Convention. 
For example, William Paterson, Convention delegate from New Jersey, wrote in 1786, 
“An increase of paper money if it be a tender, will destroy what little credit is left; will 
bewilder conscience in the maze of dishonest speculations; will allure some and constrain 
others into perpetuation of knavish tricks, will turn vice into legal virtue; and will 
sanctify iniquity by law.” (Warren 551 [italics added]). The debate in the New Jersey 
Gazette on 30 January 1786 focused on the difference between a non-legal-tender and a 
binding-legal-tender paper money, the latter being bad. New Jersey nevertheless made its 
1786 emission of paper money a legal tender.  
In his address to the New York Assembly in February of 1787, just a few months 
before the Convention, Hamilton pointed out the potential inequities across states that 
would arise if states paid their share of Federal taxes in their respective state paper 
monies. In effect, binding legal tender laws would allow states with higher paper money 
depreciation rates to pay less tax in specie equivalents than states with lower paper 
money depreciation rates (Syrett IV, 87; footnote 8 below).
6  Hamilton’s logic presumes 
that the problem is binding legal tender laws and not the emission of paper money per se.  
Similarly, in a letter written April 15, 1787 just a month before the Convention, 
Benjamin Franklin, Convention delegate from Pennsylvania, commented, “What you 
mention of our paper money, if you mean that of this State, Pennsylvania, is not well 
understood. It was made before my arrival [1785], and not being a legal tender can do no 
injustice to anybody nor does anyone here complain of it, though many are justly averse 




Convention delegate from Virginia, dated May 15, 1787, Richard Henry Lee wrote, 
“Knaves assure, and fools believe, that calling paper ‘money’ and making it a tender is 
the way to be rich and happy: thus the national mind is kept in continual disturbance by 
the intrigues of wicked men for fraudulent purposes, for speculative designs.” (Smyth IX, 
561; Warren 551-52 [italics added]; see also Rutland 1970, 861). 
Finally, many of the anti-paper-money statements made by the founding fathers 
before, during, and after the Convention focused not on inflation (the over-issue of paper 
money per se) but on the “fraud” and “injustice” caused when a paper money was made a 
binding legal tender (e.g. Farrand III, 350; Jensen III, 141, 402). For example, in the 
ratification debates in Pennsylvania shortly after the Convention, Wilson remarked, “It is 
true we have no tender law in Pennsylvania; but the moment you are conveyed across the 
Delaware [into New Jersey] you find it haunts your journey and follows close upon your 
heels. The paper [in New Jersey] passes commonly at twenty-five or thirty percent 
discount. How insecure is property!” (Jensen II, 500 [italics added]). 
In conclusion, many founding fathers wrote as if they understood the distinction 
between binding legal tender laws and paper money emissions per se, and that the former 
and not the latter was the source of the monetary problems at hand. It is true that many of 
the founding fathers, both pro- and anti-federalists, had made generalized anti-paper 
money statements both prior to and after the Convention, e.g. Madison, Hamilton, 
Mason, Robert Morris, etc. (Grubb 2003, 1781). This is not surprising given the debacle 
of the paper Continental dollar during the Revolution and the continuing post-war efforts 
by the states to refinance their wartime debts and stem the post-war depression by issuing 




be against current monetary policy and the use of binding legal tender laws, suffer angst 
over particular choices made by democratic legislatures, and engage in debate over what 
the best current legislative policy should be, and quite another thing to make the leap to 
enshrining absolute monetary restrictions into the supreme law of a constitution. How did 
the founding fathers during the Convention make that leap? 
II. The Beginnings—May 29 to July 26: The Virginia Plan, its Modifications, and 
Rivals 
A. The Randolph Opening 
  The Convention began in earnest on May 29th with an address by Edmund 
Randolph of Virginia. Speaking for the Virginia delegation he presented, in order, the 
following: 1) the characteristics that a proper government ought to have, 2) the defects of 
the Articles of Confederation, 3) the present dangers being faced, and 4) a remedy in the 
form of a new plan of government embodied in 15 resolutions—traditionally known as 
the Virginia Plan (Farrand I, 15-28; III, 593-594). In assessing the defects of the Articles 
of Confederation Randolph praised its authors but noted that certain problems could not 
have been foreseen by them, one of these being that in 1776 the “…the havoc of paper 
money had not been foreseen…” Randolph’s choice of words without further need of 
elucidation would be consistent with a common understanding among the delegates that 
the paper money emissions of the colonial governments prior to the Revolution had not 
caused havoc. In other words, fiat paper money per se was not the problem.  
When Randolph turned to his remedy, the Virginia Plan of government, he 
presented no specific resolution or words touching directly on paper money. However, 




that could potentially be applied to monetary issues, namely “…the National Legislature 
ought to be impowered…to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are 
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the 
exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several States, 
contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union…” Deciding 
what monies could be a legal tender in exchange across states and with the national 
government would appear to fall within this new power. But as long as a state did not 
make its paper money a legal tender for anything other than the payment of that state’s 
taxes (making it a within-the-state inside money only), then such paper money emissions 
would appear to be untouchable by national legislation. Such paper money would not 
“contravene…the articles of Union” nor would the “harmony of the United States…be 
interrupted by this exercise of individual [state] Legislation…” In essence, this can be 
interpreted as potentially restoring one pillar of British monetary oversight of the 
colonies, namely that individual states would be allowed to issue paper money as long as 
it was not made a legal tender. That Resolution 6 of the Virginia Plan as strictly worded 
potentially empowered Congress to ban state paper money emissions per se seems 
doubtful.
7 
Finally, Resolution 6 would also appear to give the national legislature the power 
to issue its own national paper currency. Given that one of the new powers to be given 
the national legislature was the ability to directly tax and collect revenue independent of 
the states (perhaps the single most important new power sought), the problem of the 
inability of the national government to redeem its paper money emissions in a timely 




problem that led to the Continental dollar fiasco during the Revolution would be 
resolved. In essence, the new powers embodied in the Virginia Plan can be interpreted as 
potentially restoring part of another pillar of British monetary oversight of the colonies, 
namely that fiat paper money (on the national level) should be adequately backed by 
future taxes. It is difficult to interpret the Virginia Plan as going beyond just 
reestablishing the colonial monetary system—adding the powers and constraints needed 
for its success.  
B. In the Shadows—The Pinckney Plan 
  At the end of the same day that Randolph presented the Virginia Plan, Charles 
Pinckney of South Carolina read his plan of government to the Convention. The speech 
Pinckney made and his plan of government were not recorded by anyone, though 
Madison wrote that along with the Virginia Plan, Pinckney’s Plan was “referred to the 
Committee of the whole [the entire Convention]…” And Robert Yates of New York 
wrote that Pinckney “…confessed that it [his plan] was grounded on the same principle as 
of the above resolutions [the Virginia Plan]” (Farrand I, 16, 23, 24). Over the next two 
months the Convention debated the details of the Virginia Plan, using it as the edifice for 
constructing a new plan of government. The Pinckney Plan disappeared into the shadows. 
It was never directly debated by the Convention. However, given that the Pinckney Plan 
appears to re-emerge after July 26th in the Committee of Detail and have an impact on 
that Committee’s reshaping of the amended Virginia Plan on monetary issues, it is 





  After the Convention Pinckney published a pamphlet purporting to be the speech 
he delivered at the opening of the Convention. How much of this material comprises 
additions and deletions after the fact is hard to say and is a caveat to keep in mind 
(Farrand III, 106-123, 595-609). Pinckney argued that the national Congress should have 
the power both to revise and negate any state laws that appear to the national Congress as 
improper. Pinckney wrote, “The proceedings of the States which merely respect their 
local concerns, will always be passed [by the national congress] as matters of form, and 
objections only arise where they shall endeavor to contravene the Federal Authority” 
(Farrand III, 112-115). While this statement gives broader power over state laws than the 
Virginia Plan, on monetary issues it would appear to lead to the same outcome as the 
Virginia Plan. The national government could not stop states from issuing a non-legal-
tender inside paper money because that would be a purely local concern, but the national 
government could stop states from making their paper money a legal tender particularly 
with regard to its use in outside-money transactions (payments across-states and to the 
National Treasury). 
Pinckney also wrote that the national government should have, “The exclusive 
right of…determining in what species of money the common Treasury shall be 
supplied… If you allow the States to…emit Bills of Credit, they will force you to take 
them in payment for Federal Taxes and Duties,…and though, Congress may determine, 
that nothing but Specie shall be received in payment of Federal Taxes or Duties, yet, 
while the States retain the rights they at present possess, they will always have it in their 
power, if not totally to defeat, yet very much to retard and confuse the collection of 




United States the exclusive right of coining, and determining in what manner the Federal 
Taxes shall be paid” (Farrand III, 117-118). This statement argues that the national 
government should have power to prevent states from making their paper monies legal 
tender with regard to payments to the national government.
8 
In the second sentence quoted above Pinckney would appear to be suggesting that 
state emissions of paper money be banned outright. However, reading the key elements 
of the passage more closely suggests that that is not the case, namely “If you allow the 
States to…emit Bills of Credit, they will force you to take them…[as long as] the States 
retain the rights they at present possess…” The only relevant other “right” Pinckney 
could be referring to at the end of this passage (he explicitly mentions emitting bills of 
credit at the outset of the passage) is a state’s right to declare its paper money a legal 
tender. It is the state’s legal tender power that is the source of mischief, not the emission 
of paper money per se. This interpretation is consistent with why Pinckney only proposes 
that the national government be given the power to determine “in what manner Federal 
Taxes shall be paid” and makes no proposal to ban state emissions of paper money. (See 
also the interpretation in Farrand III, 604-607). 
However, in the Pinckney Plan that was among the papers of the Committee of 
Detail there is no mention of any national government power to determine “in what 
manner Federal Taxes shall be paid” or anything related explicitly to paper money or 
legal tender laws. Only the following related clause appears: “Each State retains its 
Rights not expressly delegated—But no Bill of the Legislature of any State shall become 
a law till it shall have been laid before S. &. H. D. in C. [Senate and House of Delegates 




clause similar to this in the Virginia Plan was voted removed by the Convention prior to 
turning their deliberations over to the Committee of Detail. 
C. Debating and Amending the Virginia Plan—May 30th through July 26th 
  From May 30th through July 26th the Committee of the Whole (the entire 
Convention) debated and amended the Virginia Plan, including hearing rival plans. 
Monetary powers, while not directly addressed, remained a subtext in these debates and 
played a role in defining the future path taken. 
On May 31st Resolution 6 of the Virginia Plan was debated. Regarding the clause 
“the National Legislature ought to be impowered…to legislate in all cases to which the 
separate States are incompetent…” Pinckney and John Rutledge of South Carolina 
“objected to the vagueness of the term incompetent, and …[wanted to] see an exact 
enumeration of the powers comprehended by this definition.” Randolph “disclaimed any 
intention to give indefinite powers to the national Legislature, declaring that he was 
entirely opposed to such an inroad on State jurisdictions…” Wilson “observed that it 
would be impossible to enumerate the powers which the federal Legislature ought to 
have.” Finally, Madison “said that he had brought with him into the Convention a strong 
bias in favor of an enumeration and definition of powers necessary to be exercised by the 
national Legislature; but had also brought doubts concerning its practicability.”
 9  This 
phrase of Resolution 6 was then passed unaltered 10 to 1. The next two phrases of 
Resolution 6 (that the national legislature should have the power to legislate where the 
harmony of the U.S. may be interrupted by the exercise of individual state legislation and 
to negate all laws by the states contravening the articles of Union) were agreed to without 




  State paper money is first explicitly mentioned in the Convention on June 6th by 
Mason in the debate over whether the national legislature should be elected by the people 
or by the state legislatures with Mason being strongly in favor of election by the people.
10  
Mason argued that “…there was a better chance for proper elections by the people,…than 
by the State Legislatures. Paper money had been issued by the latter when the former 
were against it. Was it to be supposed that the State Legislatures then would not send to 
the National legislature patrons of such projects if the choice depended on them” 
(Farrand I, 134). By contrast, Pinckney favored election by the state legislatures rather 
than by the people. Pinckney “differed from gentlemen who thought that a choice by the 
people would be a better guard against bad measures, than by the Legislatures. A 
majority of the people in S. Carolina were notoriously for paper money as a legal tender; 
the Legislature had refused to make it a legal tender. The reason was that the latter had 
some sense of character…” (Farrand I, 137).
11  Finally, in the continuation of this debate 
the next day Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, who also favored election by the state 
legislatures, insisted “that the commercial & monied interests would be more secure in 
the hands of the State Legislatures, than of the people at large. The former have more 
sense of character, and will be restrained by that from injustice. The people are for paper 
money when the Legislatures are against it. In Massachusetts the County Conventions 
had declared a wish for a depreciating paper that would sink itself” (Farrand I, 154-155).  
  This initial explicit introduction of state paper money into the Convention debates 
illustrates two argument-transformation themes in the rhetoric used at the Convention 
that would continue and escalate in intensity over the remainder of the Convention. The 




emissions per se with legal tender powers. While Pinckney makes a clear distinction 
between state paper money as a legal tender and state paper money per se (suggesting 
that it is the former and not the latter that is bad), his statement will be (sans one other) 
the last time this distinction will be made at the Convention. Instead, as illustrated by 
Mason’s and Gerry’s comments, the subsequent comments on state monetary powers will 
undergo definition creep whereby emitting paper money and making paper money a 
binding legal tender will become synonymous. The rhetoric will then slide into just 
referencing the emission of paper money per se—forcing it to take on the entire mantle of 
what is evil about state monetary powers. The second argument-transformation theme is 
that in all subsequent comments on paper money there is a presumption that paper money 
per se is bad. The power to emit paper money became a rhetorical code phrase for evil. 
  On June 8th Pinckney and Madison proposed strengthening Resolution 6 of the 
Virginia Plan so that the national legislature would have the power to negate any state 
law the national legislature thought was improper, rather than just those contravening the 
articles of union. Though not directly mentioned, this change would give the national 
legislature the power unconditionally to stop all state emissions of paper money if it so 
wanted. In the ensuing debate, Gerry argued that he “could not see the extent of such a 
power, and was against every power that was not necessary. … [But] He had no objection 
to authorize a negative to paper money and similar measures.” Sherman wanted the cases 
enumerated where a negative could be applied. However, Wilson again stated, “A 
definition of the cases in which the Negative should be exercised, is impracticable.” 
Others thought it would become a tool whereby the large states would tyrannize the small 




  Gerry’s comment in the above debate is the only time at the Convention prior to 
submitting the Convention’s deliberations to the Committee of Detail (July 26th) that 
anyone suggested a specific monetary power that the national government should 
possess, namely the power to stop state emissions of paper money. Gerry’s suggestion 
was also not taken up, commented on, or further debated before July 26th. His comment 
also illustrates the ease with which the definitional slide was made at the Convention 
from legal tender laws being the problem to state paper money per se being the problem. 
  On June 15th Paterson presented what is traditionally referred to as the New 
Jersey Plan. Largely designed as a “small” state alternative to the “large” states’ views on 
representation in the national government, it contained nothing specifically or indirectly 
that would bear on monetary powers, certainly nothing beyond that in the Virginia Plan 
(Farrand I, 241-280, III, 611-615).
12  On June 18th Hamilton made his major speech that 
included his plan of government. Like the New Jersey Plan, the Hamilton Plan contained 
nothing directly or indirectly that would bear on monetary powers beyond that in the 
Virginia Plan. Hamilton did take the opportunity in his speech to join the chorus of 
rhetoricians using the emission of paper money per se as an illustration of an evil that had 
to be stopped. While lauding the British Constitution Hamilton said, “Their house of 
Lords is a most noble institution. …. They form a permanent barrier against every 
pernicious innovation,… No temporary Senate will have firmness enough to answer the 
purpose. The Senate of Maryland which seems to be so much appealed to, has not yet 
been sufficiently tried. Had the people been unanimous & eager, in the late appeal to 
them on the subject of a paper emission they would have yielded to the torrent” (Farrand 




  In a long speech on June 19th Madison argued that the New Jersey Plan would 
not “...prevent trespasses of the States on each other…[that] He considered the emissions 
of paper money as also aggressions. The States relatively to one another being each of 
them either Debtor or Creditor; the Creditor States must suffer unjustly from every 
emission by the debtor States. We have seen retaliating acts on this subject which 
threatened danger not to the harmony only, but the tranquility of the Union” (Farrand I, 
317-318).
13  Again the two argument-transformation themes appear in Madison’s speech, 
namely, the problem created by binding legal tender laws—the “trespasses of the States 
on each other”—is redefined as being created by the emission of paper money per se and 
that this by itself is evil. 
  On July 16th the Convention revisited the clause of Resolution 6 of the amended 
Virginia Plan giving the national legislature the power “…to legislate in all cases to 
which the separate States are incompetent; or in which the harmony of the U.S. may be 
interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation…” The Convention again considered 
the vagueness of this power and whether it should be explicitly enumerated. Pierce Butler 
of South Carolina called for “…some explanation of the extent of this power; particularly 
of the word incompetent. The vagueness of the term rendered it impossible for any 
precise judgment to be formed.” Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts argued, “We are 
now establishing general principles, to be extended hereafter into details which will be 
precise & explicit” (Farrand II, 17). 
  On July 17th the Convention again took up this clause in Resolution 6. This time 
it was Sherman who “observed that it would be difficult to draw the line between the 




the clause be amended to rule out national legislation that would “…interfere with the 
Government of the individual States in any matters of internal police which respect the 
Government of such States only, and wherein the General welfare of the United States is 
not concerned.” Gouverneur Morris opposed this wording. He argued that “The internal 
police, as it would be called & understood by the States ought to be infringed in many 
cases, as in the case of paper money & other tricks by which Citizens of other States may 
be affected” (Farrand II, 25-26). Morris’ rhetoric here has again muddled the lines 
between state paper money emissions per se and the power to declare them a legal tender, 
making the emission of paper money per se bear the entire burden of the problems caused 
by legal tender laws—the “tricks by which Citizens of other States may be affected.” 
Sherman’s proposal was voted down, 8 to 2, and the original clause of Resolution 
6, with some slight rewording, was passed 6 to 4 (Farrand II, 25-26). The debate over this 
clause up to this point is interesting for monetary powers. The strict construction of the 
clause would appear to give the national legislature no power to stop state emissions of 
paper money per se, but would appear only to give the national legislature the power to 
stop states from declaring said money a legal tender in trans-state or national transactions. 
However, Morris’ statement above would appear to construe the clause more broadly, 
namely to include national prohibition of even a purely inside state paper money. Morris’ 
statement seems to be claiming that anything whatsoever that will possibly affect a 
citizen of another state falls under the power of national prohibition in Resolution 6 
regarding the “harmony of the United States.”  
Yet, later that same day (July 17th), Morris strongly opposed giving the national 




28). This action contradicts the seemingly broad-power interpretation of his prior 
statement that he used when rejecting Sherman’s motion. Considering all of Morris’ 
statements together would appear to yield one consistent and narrow concern, namely 
getting the power to prevent state emission of paper money per se. In a letter to Timothy 
Pickering, December 22, 1814, Morris more or less admitted to this, saying that he had 
“little recollection” of the details of the Convention, but that “Propositions to 
countenance the issue of paper money, and the consequent violation of contracts, must 
have met with all the opposition I could make” (Farrand III, 419-420). Even years after 
the Convention, Morris continued to muddle the lines between paper money per se and 
legal tender laws. The “consequent violation of contract” would only occur if paper 
money were made a legal tender—again illustrating the slide of logic and definition creep 
intended to make the emission of paper money per se bear the entire burden of the 
problems cause by legal tender laws.  
 On July 17th the Convention also revisited the clause of Resolution 6 of the 
amended Virginia Plan giving the national legislature the power “To negative all laws 
passed by the several States contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the 
articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of ye Union.” This clause, 
agreed to on May 31st without debate or dissent, now excited significant opposition. It 
was deleted by a vote of 7 to 3 (Farrand II, 27-28). Removal of this power would make it 
more difficult for the national government using the power in the prior clause in 
Resolution 6 (considered immediately above) to directly stop a state from issuing a legal 




On July 21st, while debating whether the national judiciary along with the 
executive should have the power to revise or veto laws passed by the national legislature, 
Morris continued the drumbeat of the evils of legislative emissions of paper money per 
se. He said, “Emissions of paper money, largesses to the people—a remission of debts 
and similar measures, will at sometimes be popular, and will be pushed for that reason.… 
The press is indeed a great means of diminishing the evil, yet it is found to be unable to 
prevent it altogether” (Farrand II, 76). Morris’ rhetoric here lumps paper money 
emissions per se with “largesses to the public” and “a remission of debts.” But this would 
only typically be the case for paper money under a legal tender law and not for paper 
money per se (Holton 2004).  
  On July 26th the Convention’s deliberations were submitted to a Committee of 
Detail to craft a draft constitution. Up to this point no explicit or direct proposals 
regarding monetary powers had been made. At best, what remained of Resolution 6 of the 
Virginia Plan potentially gave the national government the power to determine what 
monies could be legal tender for cross-state trade and in transactions with the national 
government, but as strictly constructed it probably could not be construed as giving the 
national government power to prohibit state emissions of a non-legal-tender inside paper 
money. However, Convention rhetoric on paper money, such as that by Gerry, Mason, 
Madison, Hamilton, and Morris had continuously conflated paper money with legal 
lender laws thus forcing the emission of paper money per se to bear the entire burden of 
the problems caused by legal tender laws. This rhetoric set the stage for the Committee of 
Detail to leap for the first time at the Convention to incorporating explicit clauses into the 




may not have been enough to achieve this leap. Whether by conspiratorial craft or lucky 
accident, a timely demonstration of the “evils” of state paper money was on display in 
Philadelphia for the delegates to see. 
III. Paper Money Riot Interlude? 
  A riot over Pennsylvania State paper money broke out in Philadelphia in mid-
July. The Pennsylvania Herald and General Advertiser described two incidents—the first 
on July 14th: 
A correspondent observes that the speculations of a few artful people have 
been frequently found extremely detrimental to the public; and no class is too 
low; that it cannot by a bold combination, accomplishith its object. The hucksters 
lately came to a resolution not to receive the copper-currency at less than 24 
pieces for a shilling; but this depreciation was not publicly divulged til they had 
passed all their stock of half-pence at the former value. There are others who 
derive a livelihood from the exchange between the current mediums, that without 
any regard to the relative value, keep it in constant fluctuation, and, from day to 
day, pronounce upon the rate at which paper-money shall be taken for specie. The 
first instance is a reproach to the policy and morals of the state, for government 
should never leave it in the power of one part of the citizens to take advantage of 
the innocent ignorance of another; and the second instance is a reproach to the 
folly and weakness of those people, who will passively adopt the suggestions of 
interested men, instead of exercising their own judgment to show, that the security 
of the paper money is of an improving rather than a decaying nature.  
 
And the second on July 21st: 
 
A correspondent remarks that the panic which prevailed on Saturday last 
[July 14th], respecting the paper-money of this state has not been more distressing 
to the poor, than astonishing to the intelligent part of the community. Many 
causes have been assigned for the sudden event, some grounded on mercantile 
negotiations, that never existed, and others drawn from mistaken or perverted 
interpretation of an expression which lately dropt from an eminent law 
character—but not one can stand a rational investigation. 
 
Convention delegates were apparently aware of the goings-on and took away a 




related the events to Thomas Jefferson, who was in Paris, in a letter dated July 18, 1787 
(Smith 1995, I, 484):  
The paper money here ceased to circulate very suddenly a few days ago. 
… The entire stagnation is said to have proceeded from a combination of a few 
people with whom the Country people deal on market days against receiving it. 
The consequence was that it was refused in the market, and great distress brought 
on the poorer Citizens. Some of the latter began in turn to form combinations of a 
more serious nature in order to take revenge on the supposed authors of the 
stagnation. The timely interposition of some influential characters prevented a 
riot, and prevailed on the persons who were opposed to the paper, to publish their 
willingness to receive it. This has stifled the popular rage, and got the paper into 
circulation again. … Nothing but evil springs from this imaginary money 
whenever it is tried, and yet the appetite for it, when it has not been tried, 
continues to be felt. 
 
An interesting question for further research is whether these troubles were 
engineered by Morris’ “monied interest” and/or the Bank of North America to help pave 
the way for an outright constitutional ban on paper money. Allan Nevins (522) concluded 
that the bank was involved, “In July of 1787, by concerted action, the banks and markets 
of Philadelphia ceased to accept them [Pennsylvania State paper money].” The timing of 
the stoppage by itself is suspicious. This event took place soon after Morris, a chief 
operating officer of the Bank of North America, returned to the Convention from New 
York where he had been since the end of May. It also occurred right before the 
Convention decided to revisit Resolution 6 of the Virginia Plan, and right before Morris 
began his drumbeat on the evils of paper money in his speeches from July 17th through 
July 21st. And it occurred just before the Convention’s deliberations were turned over to 
the Committee of Detail on which Wilson, a member of the board of the Bank of North 
America, was a key member. Otherwise, Pennsylvania State paper money had remained 
relatively stable over the long run as measured by its relatively constant (stationary with 




Grubb 2003, 1786; 2005a). Finding a combination of speculators with enough control 
over specie exchange in Philadelphia to accomplish a stoppage of paper money exchange 
that didn’t somehow involve the Bank of North America would be difficult. In any event, 
whether by conspiratorial craft or lucky accident, this overlooked episode may have been 
an important contributor to the radical transformation in constitutional monetary powers 
about to be undertaken at the Convention.  
IV. The Committee of Detail—July 27 to Aug. 6: The Initial Restructuring of 
Monetary Powers 
  On July 26th the Convention referred the Virginia Plan as amended by the 
Convention to that point, as well as the New Jersey Plan and the non-debated Pinckney 
Plan, to a Committee of Detail to craft a draft constitution. This Committee consisted of 
Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, Gorham, Randolph, Rutledge, and Wilson (Farrand II, 
85, 97-98, 128-137). Five working drafts attributed to the Committee have survived—
four written by Wilson, with the last containing emendations by Rutledge, and one 
written by Randolph with emendations by Rutledge. Working backwards from the final 
product reported to the Convention on August 6th, Wilson’s last working draft (with 
emendations by Rutledge) appears to be the principle penultimate draft of the Committee 
(Farrand II, 163-175, 177-189; Meigs 316-324). Where Randolph’s draft fits within the 
first three Wilson drafts is hard to say; they overlap in some ways but not in others 
(Farrand II, 137-163; Meigs 316-324). Randolph’s draft, unaltered by Rutledge, and the 
first two Wilson drafts say nothing about the power to emit paper money or about 
determining what monies may be made a legal tender either by the national government 




Wilson’s third draft includes for the first time in the constitution-creation process 
an explicit clause enumerating a monetary power, namely a restriction on legal tender—
“The Legislature of U.S. shall have the exclusive Power…of determining in what Specie 
of Money the public Treasury shall be supplied” (Farrand II, 158-159). Nothing else, 
however, is said prescriptively or proscriptively in this draft about the power to emit 
paper money or about determining what monies may be a legal tender within state 
jurisdictions. This power as explicitly enumerated here by Wilson was not mentioned in 
the records of the Convention. But as argued above, it seems to be one of the powers 
within the scope of the amended Resolution 6 of the Virginia Plan. While not appearing 
in the Pinckney Plan that was given to the Committee of Detail, the wording of Wilson’s 
monetary power clause closely follows the wording in Pinckney’s speech to the 
Convention on May 29th—as published after the Convention (Farrand III, 118). 
At this juncture, the structure of the constitutional monetary powers being crafted 
were the closest to replicating the colonial monetary system as they ever would be. In 
Wilson’s third draft constitution both the national government and the state governments 
still retained the power to emit paper money. The national government had been given an 
independent power to directly tax, thus allowing it to credibly commit to redeeming its 
paper money, a power which it had not had under the Articles of Confederation, thus 
solving the key structural problem underlying the collapse of the Continental dollar. The 
national government also had the power to determine what could be legal tender for 
national government transactions. This almost replicated the British legal tender 




  From this point, the Convention embarked on a path leading to a radical departure 
from the colonial system. In Wilson’s last (fourth) working draft he dropped the legal 
tender restriction clause from his third draft and substituted in its place the clause, with 
Rutledge reordering the words slightly, “No State shall…without the Consent of the 
Legislature of the United States emit Bills of Credit.” In addition, the national 
legislature’s power to emit bills of credit, part of the old powers carried over from the 
Articles of Confederation, was now made an explicitly enumerated power given to the 
national legislature (Farrand II, 168-169). No statement about legal tender powers at any 
level of government was included in Wilson’s last draft. Perhaps Wilson reasoned that if 
Congress had the power to ban states from emitting paper money that would solve the 
problem of determining what monies could be a legal tender for national government 
transactions—the former power encompassing the latter. But this change was also a 
radical step in that it gave Congress, for the first time, the power to ban states from 
issuing even a non-legal-tender inside paper money. This change would appear to be 
going beyond the principles laid out so far by the Convention regarding national powers 
not being allowed to interfere in matters purely internal to a state. 
  Besides emendating Wilson’s last working draft, Rutledge also added comments 
to Randolph’s draft. In a margin note to Randolph’s enumerated powers given to the 
national government “To regulate coining” Rutledge wrote “no State to be perd. in future 
to emit Paper Bills of Credit witht. The App: of the Natl. Legisle nor to make any Thing 
but Specie a Tender in paymt of debts” (Farrand II, 144). Given that the second half of 
this clause does not appear in Wilson’s last working draft which Rutledge had also 




seems likely that Rutledge added this note to Randolph’s draft near the very end of the 
Committee’s deliberations. As argued above, the true monetary problem was the legal 
tender issue. Perhaps Rutledge reasoned if Congress only had Wilson’s power to ban 
state paper money, then that would not necessarily solve the legal tender problem. States 
might declare something else to be a legal tender, such as bonds, state banknotes, tobacco 
contracts, or land deeds. If trans-jurisdictional (outside) money was always to be specie, 
then states had to be prevented from making “any Thing but Specie” a legal tender. 
  The draft constitution submitted by the Committee to the Convention on August 
6th gave the national legislature the explicitly enumerated power to “…emit bills on 
credit…”, and an explicitly enumerated power over state paper money and legal tender 
laws, i.e. stating that “No State, without the consent of the Legislature of the United 
States, shall emit bills of credit, or make any thing but specie a tender in payment of 
debts…” (Farrand III, 182, 187; Meigs 134-135, 180-182, 311). By explicitly 
enumerating individual monetary powers, the Committee was forcing the Convention to 
deal up or down with these powers separately, as opposed to dealing with monetary 
powers as implied by other granted powers. What is interesting is that it would be Wilson 
himself, along with his Bank of North America protégé Morris, who would lead the attack 
on these narrowly enumerated monetary clauses, the clauses that Wilson was the first to 







V. The End Game—Aug. 6 to 28: The Absolute Constitutional Proscription of 
Monetary Powers 
A. The Absolute Prohibition on Paper Money Issued by the National Government 
From the initial Virginia Plan presented at the beginning of the Convention 
through all the Convention’s deliberations given to the Committee of Detail, the national 
legislature was designed to have all the rights and powers it possessed under the Articles 
of Confederation plus some new and enlarged powers. The Committee of Detail drafted a 
list of these new and enlarged powers. In Wilson’s last draft, but not before, this list 
included the power to “emit bills on the credit of the United States” (Farrand I, 21; II, 
131, 142-144, 158-159, 167-169, 181-183). Under the Articles of Confederation, 
Congress had exercised the power to emit bills of credit. Why the Committee of Detail 
took it upon itself in its last draft, and for the first time in the constitution-revision 
process, to put this one “old” power on the list of specifically enumerated “new and 
enlarged” powers of the federal government is unclear. One outcome of doing this 
became clear within a few days. By isolating this one “old” power from the other exiting 
“old” powers, it became easier to attack and expunge. 
With Congress being granted the new power to directly tax, the structural problem 
under the Articles of Confederation that distinguished the well-working colonial 
monetary system from the Continental dollar disaster had been removed. Under the draft 
of the new constitution offered by the Committee of Detail, paper money issued by the 
federal government, if not made a legal tender, should have worked as well as paper 




constitution, the Convention decided that under absolutely no circumstances should the 
federal government be allowed to issue paper money. 
Gouverneur Morris led the attack on this power. The first two attacks were 
indirect, with the first presented on August 15th during the debate over how easily an 
executive veto of Congressional legislation could be overridden. Morris argued that 
Congress should not have an ability to override an executive veto and, if that was not 
agreeable, requiring a 3/4 vote rather than the proposed 2/3 vote of Congress to override 
an executive veto would be preferable. Madison recorded Morris as having  
dwelt on the importance of public Credit, and the difficulty of supporting it 
without some strong barrier against the instability of legislative Assemblies. … 
The legislature will contrive to soften down the President. He recited the history 
of paper emissions, and the perseverance of the legislative assemblies in repeating 
them, with all the distressing effects of such measures before their eyes. Were the 
National legislature formed, and a war was now to break out, this ruinous 
expedient would be again resorted to, if not guarded against (Farrand II, 299). 
 
The Convention voted for a 3/4 rule (Farrand II, 301). 
What is interesting about Morris’ argument here is that he explicitly links the 
ruinous problems of paper money to “war.”
14  Was he admitting that paper money issued 
by the federal government under the new constitution would not be a problem during 
peacetime? The Convention delegates were likely aware of the “ruinous” effects of 
Congress’ wartime issue of the paper Continental dollar. The exigencies of war would 
typically require issuing more bills of credit than what could be credibly redeemed in the 
near future through taxation. Wartime inflation and price controls would be the likely 
result (Rockoff). Whether wartime inflation could have been avoided, regardless of the 
monetary powers of the federal government, was not considered. Given that the debate 




disastrous wartime inflation of the Continental dollar already firmly planted in the minds 
of the delegates with the general “evils” of paper money per se. 
The second indirect attack came early on August 16th when the Convention took 
up debating whether the federal government should have the power to tax exports. 
Among his arguments in favor of taxing exports, Morris stated, “Taxes on exports are a 
necessary source of revenue. For a long time the people of America will not have money 
to pay direct taxes. Seize and sell their effects and you push them into Revolts—.” The 
Convention, however, for other political reasons voted eventually not to allow the federal 
government to tax exports (Farrand II, 307, 374, 657).  
  Morris’ comment says a lot about what he anticipated would be the course of 
events under the monetary powers he wanted in the Constitution. Why would the “people 
of America…not have money to pay direct taxes” to the federal government? If the 
federal government issued an inside paper money, it would have to accept that paper 
money in payment of its taxes. Having issued said inside money the people of America 
would have little problem getting that money to pay federal taxes because, unlike outside 
money (specie), it would seldom exit the country. If, however, the federal government 
was prohibited from issuing an inside paper money, then taxes would have to be paid in 
outside money, namely specie. For the most part, specie flowed into the economy from 
the trade surpluses with the Caribbean and flowed out through the trade deficits with 
Europe. Short-run trade imbalances always occurred. While periods of specie surplus 
created little problem for paying federal taxes, periods of specie scarcity would be 
consistent with what Morris was referring to when he talked about people not having 




scarcity would be a prevalent condition in the near future (Holton 2004, 2005b). Because 
exports are more likely to be purchased with specie, taxing exports would give the federal 
government direct access to specie as tax payments. 
  Morris’ comment also comes close to admitting what the true problem was 
regarding the late 1786 and early 1787 rebellion in Massachusetts, called Shay’s 
Rebellion, that so affected the delegates at the Convention—the likely reference to 
“Revolts” in the above quote. If inside paper money is eliminated and the general public 
is required to pay taxes in specie, as Massachusetts did after the Revolution, and if short-
run shifts in external trade cause a period of specie scarcity, then some people will be tax 
delinquents and forced into bankruptcy. The government will have to confiscate and sell 
the tax delinquents’ property for tax arrears. Such distressed property sales, when specie 
is scarce, leads to substantially lower-than-average prices for the tax delinquents’ 
property. Those with wealth scoop up this property as fire-sale bargains. Given that those 
who got the fire-sale bargains may have also been or were suspected of being involved in 
engineering the passage of such money-tax policies in the first place, a sense of injustice 
and hence revolt was the outcome. This was the essence of Shay’s Rebellion, as well as 
the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania in 1796. Stopping something like this 
also lay behind the Rhode Island emission of paper money in 1786 (Bishop; Bouton; 
Grubb 2003, 1789-1790; Holton 2004). Federalist rhetoric paints these episodes as 
excesses of democracy where the populous rage for an inflationary paper money was led 
by debtors out to cheat their creditors. By contrast, these episodes may really have been 
examples of wealthy creditors out to use their power in government to alter the rules and 
confiscate more wealth from the poor.




access to specie via taxing exports was one solution to the chain of events that might 
likely accompany a prohibition on paper money emissions. 
Having set the stage and gauged the opinions of Convention delegates, late on 
August 16th Morris made his move to absolutely ban federally-issued paper money—
moving to strike out the words “and emit bills on the credit of the United States” from the 
enumerated powers granted the national legislature. He reasoned that “If the United 
States had credit such bills would be unnecessary: If they had not unjust & useless.” The 
debate that followed is worth quoting at length: 
Mr. Madison, will it not be sufficient to prohibit the making them a 
tender? This will remove the temptation to emit them with unjust views. And 
promissory notes in that shape may in some emergencies be best. 
Mr. Gouverneur Morris. Striking out the words will leave room still for 
notes of a responsible minister which will do all the good without the mischief. 
The Monied interest will oppose the plan of Government, if paper emissions be 
not prohibited. 
Mr. Gorham was for striking out, without inserting any prohibition. If the 
words stand they may suggest and lead to the measure. 
Col. Mason had doubts on the subject. Congress he thought would not 
have the power unless it were expressed. Though he had a mortal hatred to paper 
money, yet as he could not foresee all emergencies, he was unwilling to tie the 
hands of the Legislature. He observed that the late war could not have been 
carried on, had such a prohibition existed. 
M. Gorham—The power as far as it will be necessary or safe, is involved 
in that of borrowing. 
Mr. Mercer was a friend to paper money, though in the present state & 
temper of America, he should neither propose nor approve of such a measure. He 
was consequently opposed to a prohibition of it altogether. It will stamp suspicion 
on the Government to deny it a discretion on this point. It was impolitic also to 
excite the opposition of all those who were friends to paper money. The people of 
property would be sure to be on the side of the plan, and it was impolitic to 
purchase their further attachment with the loss of the opposite class of Citizens 
Mr. Ellsworth thought this a favorable moment to shut and bar the door 
against paper money. The mischiefs of the various experiments which had been 
made, were now fresh in the public mind and had excited the disgust of all the 
respectable part of America. By withholding the power from the new Government 
more friends of influence would be gained to it than by almost any thing else—
Paper money can in no case be necessary—Give the Government credit, and other 




Mr. Randolph, notwithstanding his antipathy to paper money, could not 
agree to strike out the words, as he could not foresee all the occasions that might 
arise. 
Mr. Wilson. It will have a most salutary influence on the credit of the 
United States to remove the possibility of paper. This expedient can never 
succeed whilst its mischiefs are remembered. And as long as it can be resorted to, 
it will be a bar to other resources. 
Mr. Butler. remarked that paper was a legal tender in no Country in 
Europe. He was urgent for disarming the Government of such a power. 
Mr. Mason was still averse to tying the hands of the Legislature 
altogether. If there was no example in Europe as just remarked it might be 
observed on the other side, that there was none in which the Government was 
restrained on this head. 
Mr. Read, thought the words, if not struck out, would be as alarming as the 
mark of the Beast in Revelations. 
Mr. Langdon had rather reject the whole plan than retain the three words 
“and emit bills.” 
[The motion to striking out “and emit bills” was passed 9 to 2.]
16 (Farrand II, 308-
310). 
 
  There are several important aspects to this debate. First, the logic of the rhetoric 
used above indicates that the founding fathers were operating under the assumption that 
unless a power was explicitly given to the national government in the Constitution (or 
directly implied by a power explicitly granted) that that power was denied to the national 
government. By voting to strike out the words “and emit bills of credit” from the list of 
powers to be given Congress, they considered themselves as voting to prohibit paper 
emission by the national government—else their vote makes no sense. An explicit vote to 
remove a power would trump any “implied” power argument for the national government 
retaining that power under the auspices of some other explicitly granted power—else 
explicitly removing that power from the list of powers granted makes no sense (assuming 
that the founding fathers were not deliberately writing a deceitful Constitution—ratifying 




Second, for only the second (and last) time at the Convention the distinction was 
raised between legal tender laws and the emission of paper money per se. And when 
Madison raised this distinction—indicating that it was legal tender laws that caused all 
the problems—Morris’ response was blunt and absolute, “The Monied interest will 
oppose the plan of Government, if paper emission be not prohibited.” This absolute 
prohibition with no qualifying considerations, and the (rather grandstanding) willingness 
of Morris and his “monied interest” to risk losing the whole Constitution if an absolute 
prohibition was not agreed to, was also echoed by several other delegates in the quote 
above.
17  In addition, as if in answer to Madison, the game of conflating legal tender laws 
with the emission of paper money per se was reasserted by all the other delegates 
speaking on this matter. This absolute, risk all, no-compromise position taken by the 
“monied interest” on absolutely banning federally-issued paper money logically implies 
the same position with regard to state-issued paper money, which will be seen to be the 
case below. 
  Third, this debate reveals that the delegates seemed to know that the recent 
problems with paper money were not due to paper money per se, but were largely due to 
the problems of wartime finance and its aftermath (post-war depression). For example, 
Mercer refers to the “present state & temper of America” regarding paper money. Wilson 
refers to the memory of paper money’s “mischiefs.” Ellsworth refers to this time being “a 
favorable moment to shut and bar the door against paper money. The mischiefs of the 
various experiments which had been made, were fresh in the public mind…” They 
seemed willing to try the ignorance of the public and muddle the distinction between 




money emissions. If the public only remembered that the Continental dollar hyper-
inflated, and did not delve into the underlying causes of it, then they might easily blame it 
on the emission of paper money per se. That a paper money expedient could be the best 
choice from among the set of necessary financing evils during a war was noted but not 
seriously considered. Madison’s reference to some “emergencies” and Randolph’s to not 
being able to “foresee all occasions,” when paper money might be useful, would seem to 
refer to wartime financing, and Mason explicitly says that “the late war could not have 
been carried on” without paper money. The peacetime versus wartime financial 
distinction was trampled under in the drive to absolutely ban government-issued paper 
money. 
  Fourth, Morris says something very cryptic and telling about what alternatives 
might be available. In response to Madison’s legal tender question, Morris initially says, 
“striking out the words leave room still for notes of a responsible minister which will do 
all the good without the mischief.” Who did Morris mean by “responsible minister”? It 
cannot be an official arm of the national government as Morris finishes his statement with 
“The Monied interest will oppose the plan of Government, if paper emissions be not 
prohibited.” And no government “minister” in the executive branch, such as the future 
Secretary of the Treasury, would have an independent power to tax and so control paper 
money backing or have the power to control specie deposits in such a way as to function 
as Morris’ “responsible minister” for issuing paper money. Who else is left? There is 
perhaps only one candidate, Morris’ Bank of North America.
18   
Since 1782 the Bank of North America had been trying to get its banknotes to 




Wilson). Wilson, a member of the board of the bank, had argued in 1785 that the 
“…advantage…[of] the bank of North America is the establishment of an undepreciating 
paper currency through[out] the United States” (Adams 146). Apparently, Morris and 
Wilson are not against all paper money, only against tax-backed government-issued paper 
money. Banknotes that were fractionally backed in specie were acceptable. In other 
words, Morris wanted governments at all levels to surrender paper money issuing power 
to private banks, with the only quasi-national bank at the time being his Bank of North 
America. Why did Morris use the cryptic phrase “responsible minister” and not just come 
right out and say “Bank of North America”?  It is likely, as will be shown below, that 
Morris did not say “bank” because the mere mention of the word, even among the 
Convention delegates, was so controversial that it was likely to kill the new 
Constitution.
19 
B. The Absolute Prohibition on Paper Money Issued by State Governments 
Having secured an absolute ban on federally issued paper money, the move to 
absolutely prohibit state issued paper money was probably a foregone conclusion. On 
August 28th the Convention got to that part of the draft constitution.
20  Wilson and 
Sherman moved to cut the phrase “without the consent of the Legislature of the United 
States” from the clause “No State, without the consent of the Legislature of the United 
States, shall emit bills of credit, or make any thing but specie a tender in payment of 
debts…” This change, “making these prohibitions absolute,” elevated state paper money 
to being on a par with higher-order political matters such as prohibiting states from 




Having achieved the ban on federal bills of credit with the argument that “The 
Monied interest will oppose the plan of Government, if paper emissions be not 
prohibited,” the ensuing debate was short: 
Mr. Gorham thought the purpose would be as well secured by the 
provision…which makes the consent of the General Legislature necessary, and 
that in that mode, no opposition would be excited; whereas an absolute 
prohibition of paper money would rouse the most desperate opposition from its 
partisans— 
Mr. Sherman thought this a favorable crisis for crushing paper money. If 
the consent of the Legislature could authorize emissions of it, the friends of paper 
money would make every exertion to get into the Legislature in order to license it. 
 
The question was divided into whether to have an absolute prohibition on states emitting 
bills of credit, which passed 8 to 2, and whether to make the legal tender clause an 
absolute prohibition, which passed 11 to 0 (Farrand II, 435, 439). The separate votes on 
the two clauses indicate that the founding fathers could have potentially decided only to 
absolutely ban legal tender provisions but not state paper money emissions per se—
indicating that despite the rhetoric that frequently conflated these two issues the founding 
fathers recognized that legal tender laws and paper money emissions per se were in fact 
not the same issue.
21 
Sherman’s statement about it being a “favorable crisis” for crushing paper money 
suggests that paper money per se was not the problem, and that the public’s confusion of 
wartime finance and post-war depression monetary problems with peacetime or normal 
monetary performance could be used to win an absolute paper money ban. Gorham’s 
statement, as well as John Francis Mercer’s statement in the prior quote, also suggests 
that the anti-paper money faction was willing to risk alienating much of the public and so 






Finally, on the same day a short debate took place that reveals what was not the 
motive for banning state paper money. Rufus King of Massachusetts, “moved to add, … 
a prohibition on the States to interfere in private contracts” to the list of powers to be 
prohibited to the states. Morris responded that, “This would be going too far. … and 
within the State itself a majority must rule, whatever may be the mischief done among 
themselves.” Sherman then asked, “Why then prohibit [State] bills of credit?” To which 
no answer was recorded (Farrand II, 439-440). For Morris, the problem with paper 
money apparently was not that it could be used to redistribute income from one group to 
another by effectively altering values within private contracts via legal tender laws and/or 
unanticipated inflationary issues of paper money. Morris recognized that there were 
myriad ways of redistributing income via state laws that were probably easier to institute 
regarding the targeting of benefits than the rather clumsy method of issuing a 
depreciating state currency (Nettels 85-86). Morris apparently did not care about intra-
state political machinations leading to income redistribution schemes—rejecting one of 
the common arguments the historical literature has ascribed to the Convention (and him) 
for why state paper money was banned. 
 VI. National Banking as a Substitute Monetary Power?—Aug. 28 to Sept. 14 
  The British extended the Bubble Act to the colonies in 1741. This Act did not 
allow corporations to form that had over six partner/investors, which in turn effectively 
stopped commercial banks from developing in the colonies (Perkins 41; Priest). With 
independence, colony/states were free to incorporate banks, which they began to do in 
1781 when Pennsylvania chartered the Bank of North America, and in 1784 when New 




respectively. Efforts to charter banks were underway in other states between 1784 and 
1787, such as in Maryland where the state’s Senate had passed a bank charter bill that 
was being blocked by that state’s House of Delegates. These banks took in deposits in 
specie and issued banknotes as claims against said deposits and as loans. Depositors 
could also issue checks as claims on their specie deposits. These banks were basically 
engaged in modern, though unregulated, fractional-reserve practices with specie serving 
as reserves. They issued more banknotes, loans, and claims on their specie deposits than 
they had specie on reserve. While not a legal tender, these banknotes circulated as a 
geographically localized currency because they could be redeemed in specie at the 
issuing bank at face value, except during liquidity crises, but at variable market-
determined discounts off the face value farther away from the issuing bank. Banknotes 
competed with each other for usage as an inside paper money and with state bills of 
credit. Banks and bank charters were a contentious and controversial issue in many state 
legislatures (Behrens 79-87; Bryan 17-19; Freeman 575-612; Gras; Grubb 2003, 2005a; 
Lewis; Nettels 75-81; Webster; Wilson). 
A. Who Shall Have the Power to Charter Banks? 
  At the Convention, the delegates did not address the states’ power of 
incorporation, either in general or with specific reference to banking. Apparently such 
state powers were acceptable to the founding fathers and they were to be left intact by the 
new Constitution. Several delegates were closely involved with state chartered banks, 
either as stockholders, board members, directors, legal advisors, or sponsors of banking 
bills, including Hamilton, Gerry, King, McHenry, John Langdon of New Hampshire, 




Franklin, Thomas Mifflin, George Clymer, Jared Ingersoll, Thomas Fitzsimons, Robert 
Morris, and Gouverneur Morris (Grubb 2003, 2005a; McDonald 89). Perhaps then it is 
not surprising that the state power to charter banks was left untouched by the Convention. 
 Under  the  Articles of Confederation it was doubtful whether Congress had the 
power to charter a national bank. For example, in 1780 Hamilton suggested that a 
national “Convention should assemble” to remedy the Articles of Confederation by 
granting Congress the power of “establishing banks….” (Freedman 76-77). In the 1785-
1787 controversy in the Pennsylvania State Legislature over that state’s charter of the 
Bank of North America, which Congress had also chartered and intended to be its 
national bank, the actions of both the pro- and anti-bank parties indicated that both sides 
had little faith in the validity of a charter from Congress. Both sides thought a state 
charter was necessary (Lewis; Rappaport; Webster; Wilson). If a national bank chartered 
by the federal government were to be allowed, it would have to fall under one of the new 
and enlarged powers specifically enumerated in the new Constitution. 
Whether the national government should be given the power to charter a national 
bank was taken up in a roundabout way on September 14th when the Convention 
addressed the general versus specific powers of incorporation to be granted the national 
government. With regard to the power of incorporation, the draft constitution up to that 
point gave the national government only the specific enumerated power to establish post 
offices and post roads. Franklin moved that the national government also have the power 
to cut canals. The debate expanded from there and the exchange between the delegates is 
worth quoting at length (from Madison’s notes): 
Mr. Madison suggested an enlargement of the motion into a power “to 




legislative provisions of individual States may be incompetent.” His primary 
object was however to secure an easy communication between States which the 
free intercourse now to be opened, seemed to call for—The political obstacles 
being removed, a removal of the natural ones as far as possible ought to follow. 
Mr. Randolph 2ded. the proposition. 
    Mr King thought the power unnecessary. 
    Mr Wilson. It is necessary to prevent a State from obstructing the general  
 welfare. 
  Mr King—The States will be prejudiced and divided into parties by it—In 
Philadelphia & New York, It will be referred to the establishment of a Bank, 
which has been a subject of contention in those Cities. In other places it will be 
referred to mercantile monopolies. 
Mr. Wilson mentioned the importance of facilitating by canals, the 
communication with the Western Settlements—As to Banks he did not think with 
Mr. King that the power in that point of view would excite the prejudices & 
parties apprehended. As to mercantile monopolies they are already included in the 
power to regulate trade. 
Col: Mason was for limiting the power to the single case of Canals. He 
was afraid of monopolies of every sort, which he did not think were by any means 
already implied by the Constitution as supposed by Mr. Wilson. 
The motion being so modified as to admit a distinct question specifying & 
limited to the case of canals. [The motion failed 8 to 3.] 
The other part fell of course, as including the power rejected (Farrand II, 
615-616). 
 
McHenry’s notes support Madison’s notes on this issue. He wrote, “Moved by Dr. 
Franklin seconded by Mr. Willson, to empower Congress to open and establish canals. 
This being objected to—moved by Virginia To empower Congress to grant charters of 
incorporation in cases where the U.S. may require them and where the objects of them 
cannot be obtained by a State. Negatived” (Farrand II, 620). 
  Both Madison’s and McHenry’s notes of the Convention for that day are 
corroborated by an incident recorded by Jefferson some years later. Jefferson wrote in his 
personal notes on March 11, 1798:  
[Abraham] Baldwin [Convention delegate from Georgia] mentions at table the 
following fact. When the bank bill [First Bank of the U.S.] was under discussion 
in the House of Representatives [1791], Judge [James] Wilson came in, and was 
standing by Baldwin. Baldwin reminded him of the following fact passed in the 




one to erect corporations. It was, on debate, stuck out. Several particular powers 
were then proposed. Among others, Robert Morris proposed to give Congress a 
power to establish a national bank. Gouverneur Morris opposed it, observing that 
it was extremely doubtful whether the constitution they were framing could ever 
be passed at all by the people of America; that to give it its best chance, however, 
they should make it as palatable as possible, and put nothing into it not very 
essential, which might raise up enemies; that his colleague (Robert Morris) well 
knew that ‘a bank’ was, in their State (Pennsylvania) the very watch-word of 
party; that a bank had been the great bone of contention between the two parties 
of the State…that therefore, to insert this power, would instantly enlist against the 
whole instrument, the whole of the anti-banking party in Pennsylvania. 
Whereupon it was rejected, as was every other special power, except that of 
giving copyrights to authors, and patents to inventors; the general power of 
incorporating being whittled down to this shred. Wilson agreed to the fact 
(Farrand III, 375-376). 
 
Apparently banks were more controversial than paper money, with the mere 
mention of them, even indirectly, threatening the likely ratification of the Constitution. 
Perhaps this is why on August 16th Gouverneur Morris used the term “responsible 
minister” rather than “Bank of North America” when referring to a paper-money 
substitute to federally issued bills of credit (Farrand II, 309).  
B. The Post-Convention Constitutional Controversy over Who Can Charter Banks  
It appears that the Convention intended not to give, and in a roundabout way 
voted against giving, the federal government the power of incorporation, including the 
particular power to charter banks. In 1791, however, Congress voted to charter a national 
bank—the First Bank of the U.S.—to serve as the federal government’s bank. A sharp 
debate and on going controversy ensued over the constitutionality of this act (Holdsworth 
17-19). How was this possible given the Convention debate quoted above?  
The Constitution’s construction was that any new or enlarged power that went 
beyond the Articles of Confederation that was not explicitly enumerated as granted to the 
federal government was denied it. This construction explains the Constitution’s brevity.




Except for erecting post offices and post roads, the power of incorporation including the 
power to charter banks was not one of the new enumerated powers granted the federal 
government. However, the powers explicitly voted by the Convention not to be included 
among these enumerated powers, by construction, were not to be written into the 
Constitution—thus keeping the Constitution from becoming an overly long and unwieldy 
document.  
This method of construction, however, opened an interpretive door that Hamilton 
and supporters of a national bank rushed through. When a particular power was not 
explicitly enumerated, Congress might still possess that power if that power was implied 
by other powers that were explicitly enumerated in the Constitution. Hamilton was the 
first to articulate this implied-powers doctrine, and it was in reference to the 
constitutionality of the First Bank of the U.S. (Rutland XIII, 370-404; Syrett VIII, 62-
134). This doctrine went on to become a well-known and much-studied doctrine of 
interpretation of constitutional law.  
This doctrine is derived from the conclusion to Section 8 of Article 1 of the 
Constitution that enumerates the powers of Congress. It states that Congress has the 
power “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” The rather 
plain language of this clause belies ascribing much genius to the creation of a “doctrine” 
of implied powers. Most anyone at the time could read, understand, and more-or-less 
agree on the broad meaning of this clause. For example, the Constitution did not give 




money. Almost everyone seemed to agree that the power to coin money implied the 
power to create a mint in order to coin money. The first Congress’ Congressional Mint 
Act was constitutionally uncontroversial. By contrast, Congress’ Constitutional power to 
coin money was not construed to imply the power to go into the goldsmith business or 
charter mining companies.
24  
Hamilton’s use of the implied-powers doctrine to assert that the First Bank of the 
U.S. was constitutional can be seen as a rhetorical smoke screen. Hamilton’s foes could 
read the implied-powers clause in the Constitution as well as he could. Their 
constitutional objection to the First Bank of the U.S. was not over the application or 
interpretation of this clause. To repeat: It’s not about implied powers. Implied powers 
were a necessary but not a sufficient condition.
25   
An explicit vote at the Convention to deny the federal government a particular 
power trumps any implied-powers argument for the federal government retaining such a 
power under the auspices of some other explicitly granted power. If this were not the 
case, then explicitly voting to remove said power from the list of granted powers makes 
no sense (assuming the founding fathers were not writing a deceitful Constitution—
ratifying one meaning while intending to execute another). If the Convention had 
explicitly voted not to give the federal government the power to charter a national bank, 
then that vote would trump any implied-power interpretation of the constitutionality of 
the First Bank of the U.S.  Hamilton’s own rhetorical position as well as that of Madison 
and Gerry (see below) is consistent with this understanding. 
Hamilton’s application of the implied-powers doctrine would be irrelevant if it 




government the power to charter a bank. As such, the bank supporters had to argue that 
no such debate or explicit vote took place at the Convention. Because no records of what 
transpired at the Convention were yet published in 1791, such an argument might—and 
did—succeed. This was the real issue over the constitutionality of the bank.  
The Convention had been closed to the public. The Convention’s official Journal, 
which was not made public until 1819, was in President Washington’s keeping (Farrand 
I, xi-xxi; II, 648). The Journal, however, recorded almost nothing on the day in question 
(September 14th)—only an 8 to 3 vote against “To grant letters of incorporation for 
Canals &ca” (Farrand II, 610-611). The words “&ca” seem to indicate something in 
addition to canals, but these words were not noted or discussed.
26  Madison’s notes were 
not public, and would not be published until 1840, after Madison’s death. McHenry’s 
notes, the only other notes taken that day, would not be published until even later 
(Farrand I, xv-xxi). 
In 1791 when Congress proposed the bill to charter the First Bank of the U.S., 
Madison argued in Congress that the bill was unconstitutional “because he well 
recollected that a power to grant charters of incorporation had been proposed in the 
General Convention and rejected” (Farrand III, 362). Madison had proposed that power at 
the Convention and so was likely to have been attentive regarding the ensuing debate. 
Madison also had his Convention notes to consult. Whether Madison let anyone else see 
his notes is unclear. There is no indication by him or from anyone else that he did.  
Madison was “regarded by his fellow delegates to the Convention as a semi-
official reporter of their proceedings, for several of them took pains to see that he was 




Journal failed to record most of the debates, Convention delegates who did not remember 
the debates of a given day should have deferred to Madison’s recollection based on his 
detailed semi-official notes. Some clearly did. Randolph, who was Attorney General in 
1791, as well as Jefferson as Secretary of State, concurred with Madison’s memory 
and/or accepted the authority of his recollection. For Madison, Randolph, and Jefferson 
there wasn’t much to debate. Implied powers were not enough. The Convention had 
explicitly voted not to allow Congress that power, so the First Bank of the U.S. was 
unconstitutional. They recommended that President Washington veto the bill as 
unconstitutional (Farrand III, 362-363; Rutland XIII, 370-404).  
President Washington was at the Convention on September 14th. Either he knew 
from his own memory what Madison knew, or he did not rightly remember that day’s 
debates. The latter could well be likely. Washington never engaged in the debates at the 
Convention and so may have paid little attention to particular debates. Washington did 
possess the Convention’s Journal, but this Journal recorded almost nothing on the topic 
at hand. But if Washington didn’t remember the debates of that day himself, why did he 
not accept Madison’s recollection as definitive since it was based on Madison’s own 
semi-official notes? At the Convention, Washington mostly likely watched Madison take 
these notes every day.
27  Perhaps Washington’s sympathies were strongly tied to his 
fellow officer Hamilton. Perhaps Hamilton and Robert Morris—head of the Bank of 
North America and at whose house Washington often dined during the Convention—had 
persuaded Washington that a national bank was necessary (Huston; Warren). Perhaps 
Washington was predisposed to favor any interpretative opening that would allow him 




With no public record showing that the Convention explicitly voted not to allow 
Congress the power of incorporation, the supporters of the bank could ignore Madison’s 
statement. Instead, they could claim that no one at the Convention rightly remembered 
what happened and that no such debate or vote may have even taken place. Indeed, 
Gerry, who favored a national bank, was present at the Convention on September 14th, 
but in February of 1791 he disagreed with Madison’s recollection of that day. He said, in 
direct reference to Madison’s last quote above, “…are we to depend on the memory of 
the gentleman [Madison] for a history of their debates, … This would be improper, 
because the memories of different gentlemen would probably vary, … with respect to 
those facts; … no motion was made in that Convention, and therefore none could be 
rejected for establishing a National Bank; …” (Farrand III, 362-363). This also indicates 
that it was unlikely that Madison showed his notes of the Convention to anybody else. 
Hamilton made a similar statement later that month when he wrote a defense of 
the constitutionality of First Bank of the U.S. in order to give Washington a reason not to 
veto the bill,  
Another argument…is, the rejection of a proposition by the Convention to 
empower Congress to make corporations, either generally, or for some special 
purpose.  
What was the precise nature or extent of this proposition, or what the 
reasons for refusing it, is not ascertained by any authentic document, or even by 
accurate recollection. As far as any such document exists, it specifies only canals. 
… It must be confessed, however, that very different accounts are given the 
import of the proposition, and of the motives for rejecting it. Some affirm that it 
was confined to the opening of canals and obstructions in rivers; others, that it 
embraced banks; and others, that it extended to the power of incorporating 
generally. Some, again, allege that it was disagreed to because it was thought 
improper to vest in Congress a power of erecting corporations. Others, because it 
was thought unnecessary to specify the power, and inexpedient to furnish an 
additional topic of objection to the Constitution. In this state of the matter, no 





Hamilton makes three interesting references in his argument. First he referred to 
no “authentic document” supporting Madison’s recollection. The only “authentic 
document” that exists refers only to canals. Hamilton seems to be referring to, and had 
consulted, the Convention’s Journal which was at that time in Washington’s keeping. 
Hamilton did not consider any other notes from the Convention to be an “authentic 
document.” Given that these other Convention notes had not yet been published or 
otherwise made available for others, Hamilton could plausibly deny that he was making 
an inaccurate assessment. 
Second, Hamilton’s rhetoric presumes that an explicit vote at the Convention to 
deny the federal government a particular power trumped any implied-powers argument. If 
a clear inference could be drawn from an authentic document that the Convention had 
voted to deny the federal government a given power, that sealed the fate of that power—it 
was absolutely denied to the federal government. If the Convention’s Journal had 
recorded the debate as extensively as Madison had recorded it, then by Hamilton’s own 
rhetorical structure the bank was most likely unconstitutional. More troubling is 
Hamilton’s penultimate sentence quoted above. It seems to imply that the Constitution 
offered to the public for ratification may have been intentionally misleading regarding the 
monetary powers that he now intended to exercise. 
Third, Hamilton asserts in reference to the debates at the Convention on 
September 14th that, “…the precise nature or extent of this position…[can] not [be] 
ascertained…by accurate recollection.” Why did Hamilton not refer to his own 
recollection from that day? His statement suggests that he was not present that day. 




next on September 17th, but not between those days. His absence on September 14th 
would also be consistent with the fact that if he were there it seems likely that he would 
have spoken since national banks had long been an issue of importance to him (Freeman 
1040; Syrett II, 400-418). If Hamilton was there and remembered the debate as recorded 
by Madison, then he was willingly subverting the Constitution. If Hamilton either did not 
remember the debate or was not in attendance, why did he not accept Madison’s 
recollection as definitive?
28  Hamilton knew that Madison had taken copious and semi-
official notes of the Convention. Hamilton had himself given Madison a copy of his own 
speech to the Convention so that Madison could accurately record it in his notes (Farrand 
I, xvi, 282-293; III, 617-630).
29  Washington and Hamilton’s unwillingness to defer to 
Madison’s semi-official note-based recollection is consistent with a willingness on their 
part to subvert the Constitution over the bank issue.
30 
Washington accepted Hamilton’s arguments and did not veto the bank bill 
(Holdsworth 19). The nation got a national banknote currency that circulated alongside 
the increasing plethora of banknotes issued by state-chartered banks. Perhaps Madison 
could have stopped the First Bank of U.S. if he had made his notes of the Convention 
public. Why didn’t he? Honor and the pledge to keep Convention deliberations non-
public may have trumped any desire to stop constitutionally questionable acts (Farrand I, 
15; II, 648). 
VII. Why Did They Do It? 
 Before  the  U.S. Constitution, inside paper money was issued by state and national 
legislatures. After the U.S. Constitution, both state and national legislatures were banned 




unregulated, banks filled the void. After 1789 the U.S. experienced an increasing plethora 
of different banknote paper currencies. Judging by this outcome, the founding fathers did 
not intend to constitutionally create a single uniform national paper currency or prevent 
states and their banks from competing for seignorage with each other (Grubb 2003, 1782; 
Rolnick, Smith, and Weber). And if the founding fathers are assumed not to be stupid, or 
ignorant, or inexperienced in monetary matters, if they are assumed not to be fooled by 
the difference between binding legal tender laws and paper money emission per se, if 
they are assumed not to have confused war with peacetime monetary performance, and if 
they are assumed not to have deliberately written a deceitful Constitution—intending to 
ratify one meaning but execute another—then many of the explanations offered in the 
literature and by the delegates themselves are ruled out.
31  So then, why did they do it? 
A. Rent-Seeking Bankers? 
  Grubb (2003, 2005a) argued that it was the Convention’s banking faction, e.g. 
Langdon, Baldwin, King, Hamilton, Gerry, McHenry, the entire Pennsylvania delegation, 
and maybe a few others, who wanted an absolute Constitutional ban on the emission of 
paper money by both state and national governments so as to constitutionally eliminate 
competition with banknotes over what would become the dominant paper medium of 
exchange (see also Ferguson 1969; 1983, 402, 404, 409-10; Nettels 85). Banknotes were 
having a hard time supplanting government-issued paper money as the paper medium of 
exchange. With government-issued paper money constitutionally eliminated, the power 
and profitability of these banks, especially of the national banks, such as the Bank of 
North America and subsequently the First Bank of the U.S., were substantially 
increased.




focused on paper money emission per se at both the national and the state level rather 
than just focusing narrowly on the problem of binding legal tender or just on state paper 
money, it does not explain the concurrence of those founding fathers with no apparent 
banking connections. Unless these other founding fathers were duped or arm-twisted by 
the banking faction, something more is needed. 
  Making the banking-faction argument more pervasive requires additional motives, 
such as founding fathers not enamored of national banking or directly involved with state 
banks may still have been in favor of local financial control. They may have wanted to 
achieve economic development at a more targeted local level than what state-macro-
money policies could achieve. This view is consistent with the Convention not restricting 
or even debating state power to charter local banks but banning state-issued bills of 
credit, and leaving the national government’s power to charter banks, at best, ambiguous. 
More research is needed, however, before the strength of this argument can be gauged. 
B. Big Tents, Polarization, Insider Speculation, and Income/Debt Redistribution 
Schemes?    
  Perhaps the founding fathers thought that the only way to stop binding legal-
tender issues of paper money was to ban all emissions of paper money, even non-legal 
tender emissions. Certainly much of the Federalist rhetoric cited above conflates paper 
money emissions per se with binding legal tender laws or considers the latter to be a 
consequence of the former.
33  This is the “big tent” theory of legal proscription, e.g. it is 
not enough to ban murder, all the instruments that might be used to murder must also be 




This explanation seems unlikely. First, the late colonial system had worked well 
with only a ban on legal tender paper money and not on all paper money. Second, the 
Convention did not ban other instruments that states had in the past made a legal tender. 
Third, the founding fathers did not pursue this theory on other, arguably more important, 
legal proscriptions put in the Constitution. For example, one of the key reasons for 
holding the Convention was to regulate trade between the states. As such, the founding 
fathers sought to prohibit states from taxing imports from, and exports to, other states. 
However, contrary to the “big tent” theory of Constitutional prescript, they allowed states 
to tax such imports and exports to support the execution of state-inspection laws (Farrand 
II, 605, 657), thus opening the door for states to erect cost wedges between products 
traded intra- versus inter-state, some of which were substantial (McCurdy). Finally, under 
this theory the founding fathers should have also banned banknotes or at least banned 
their acceptance as a legal tender. However, they did not do so. And Hamilton, as 
Secretary of the Treasury, simply declared that the notes of many banks were specie and 
therefore acceptable as legal-tender-like payments to the federal government (Syrett V, 
394, 532-533; VI, 386-388; IX, 489). 
   After the Revolution, legislative polarization and civil unrest in many states, e.g. 
in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Hampshire, and Virginia, 
had been linked by Federalist rhetoric to the popular rage for paper money (Farrand I, II; 
Grubb 2003, 1781; Holton 2004, 2005a, 2005b). If a goal of the Constitution was to 
eliminate polarizing political disputes within states, then banning state paper money 
rather than just restricting its legal tender status might make sense. If such were the case, 




motivation the Constitution should have also banned banks, or have replicated something 
like the British Bubble Act as applied to the colonies in 1741. State banking laws were as 
much a source of political commotion as were paper money emissions. No other 
controversial state legislative issue was singled out for Constitutional proscription. 
  A popular explanation for why the Convention banned paper money per se has 
been that delegates held public securities and feared that they would not be redeemed at 
face value (in specie) if governments could issue paper money (Beard 178-188; Ferguson 
1969; 1983; Holton 2004; McDonald 89-110; McGuire 72-74). This idea is also 
consistent with Morris’ argument that the federal government should have the power to 
tax exports and so have direct access to tax revenue paid in specie. What scholars have 
missed in this debate is that this issue is only about binding legal tender laws and not 
about paper money emissions per se. If the Convention had simply banned paper money 
from being made a legal tender, securities denominated in specie would be protected 
against being paid off in depreciated paper money. Governments issuing paper money 
would have to pay their specie-denominated debts at the market exchange rate for their 
paper money. Creditors would incur no losses. Thus, efforts to link security holdings by 
Convention delegates with votes at the Convention for banning paper money may miss 
the mark. 
  The part of this public-securities argument that can be salvaged involves 
government securities denominated in that government’s paper money. For such 
securities, governments could pay them off with newly issued paper money, even if that 
money was not a legal tender, because it was what was explicitly contracted. Security 




substantially from what it was at the time of contracting. This (unanticipated) inflation 
risk, however, was what any security holder faced no matter what monetary unit they 
contracted in—even specie. Market expectations governed price adjustments of said 
securities at the time of contracting. The gains or losses due to deflation or inflation 
would only be residual unanticipated luck. However, if governments were banned from 
issuing paper money then they would have to pay off their non-specie denominated 
securities in specie—the only money available. Because the courts would likely uphold 
contract “nominalism,” this created the potential for speculative gains by Convention 
delegates and their confidants (Holton 2004; Priest). With the Convention deliberations 
kept secret, delegates would have superior information that soon governments would 
have to pay off their non-specie-denominated securities at par in specie. They would have 
had a head start on the market and could buy up government securities at their current 
discounted prices, knowing that the securities would appreciate in the near term. This 
motive would not show up as contemporaneous correlations between delegate security 
holding and Convention votes because such a speculative scheme had not yet been 
executed. Given that few government securities were denominated in that government’s 
paper money, this motive seems unlikely. 
  Another explanation for why the founding fathers banned paper money is that 
government-issued non-specie backed paper money could be a tool of income 
redistribution. Independent of legal tender issues, income could be redistributed from 
creditors to debtors through altering values within non-specie denominated contracts via 
unanticipated inflationary issues of paper money. However, issuing depreciating state 




other state powers that could be used to redistribute income that were more efficient at 
targeting benefits and easier to implement than paper money schemes (Nettels 85-86). At 
the Convention, Morris seemed to recognize that there were myriad ways of 
redistributing income via state laws that affected private contracts, and seemed not to care 
about these intra-state political machinations leading to mischievous income 
redistribution schemes (see Section V. B. above). Madison voiced a similar assessment 
when explaining the new Constitution to Jefferson in a letter written October 24, 1787—a 
month after the Convention had closed:  
The mutability of the laws of the States is found to be a serious evil. The injustice  
of them has been so frequent and so flagrant as to alarm the most steadfast friends  
of Republicanism. … The restraints agst. paper emissions, and violations of  
contracts are not sufficient. Supposing them to be effectual as far as they go, they  
are short of the mark. Injustice may be effected by such an infinitude of  
legislative expedients, that where the disposition exists it can only be controuled  
by some provision which reaches all cases whatsoever. The partial provision  
made, supposes the disposition which will evade it (Rutland X, 212). 
 
C. Creating a Specie Reservoir in Society for the Merchant Community Involved in 
International Trade? 
Finally, a new reason will be offered here. While not all Convention delegates 
were directly connected to the nascent banking movement or holders of large amounts of 
public securities, most were connected in some way with the nation’s international 
trading community (Beard; Bradford; McDonald; McGuire 51-54). Access to outside 
money, namely specie, was critical to the functioning of this trade. In general, specie 
flowed in from the trade surpluses with the Caribbean and flowed out with the trade 
deficits with Europe. With trade having to balance over the long run, specie would 
typically be available and the presence of a non-legal-tender tax-backed inside paper 




from local citizens in payment for goods, if not used to pay local taxes, could always be 
exchanged at the market-determined rates for specie when needed to meet outside 
payments. However, trade was not always balanced in the short run. Sometimes more 
specie flowed in than out, and at other times more flowed out than in. The former caused 
no merchant outside-payment problem. However, when more specie flowed out than in, 
merchants became desperate to find specie so as not to default on their outside-money 
contractual commitments—as the 1782-1789 recession made evident.  
This problem could be solved if the merchant community could secure a reservoir 
of specie that could be tapped in times of short-run shortfalls in specie inflows and then 
filled back up again in times of short-run excess specie inflows. This was the idea behind 
the nascent merchant banks being developed at the time—having a “bank” of specie. If 
merchants dealing with international trade pooled their specie as deposits in said bank, 
then temporary short-run excesses and shortfalls in specie flows caused by the exigencies 
of trade could be smoothed across individuals within the community via intra-community 
short-term borrowing and lending. However, this could not stop large macro-trade shock 
from causing specie shortfalls and price depressions community wide, such as happened 
when Britain closed its Caribbean trade to the Americans shortly after 1783 (Bezanson 
1951; Holton 2004; Rappaport).   
The international-trading merchant community could secure a broader reservoir of 
specie in society at large from which they could draw in times of short-run shortfalls in 
specie inflows, if they could force the mass of citizens who were not directly engaged in 
international trade to nevertheless hold and use specie as their primary medium of 





34  This meant eliminating the tax-backed paper money issued both by the 
states and by the federal government; in other words, constitutionally all money was 
either made outside money (specie) or was backed by outside money (banknotes) that 
were convertible into specie on demand. This is what the founding fathers got 
constitutionally, so maybe it was their overriding intent. This constitutionally 
manufactured revolution in governmental monetary powers was not about securing 
general monetary stability, but about securing narrower special interests (Grubb 2003; 
2005a; McGuire). 
In the end, society at large paid for serving as this specie reservoir. Given the 
exigencies of trade, during periods of short-run excess specie inflows, the public 
experienced credit expansion and suffered inflationary price rises and investment 
overextension. Then during periods of short-run shortfalls in specie inflows (relative to 
outflows), the public experienced credit contraction, money scarcity, and arguably the 
more costly effects of bankruptcies, deflation, and investment retrenchment. Banks, 
functioning as a money multiplier in this process, may have structurally amplified this 
short-run or cyclical pain inflicted on the public for being the merchant community’s 
specie reservoir. An inside government-issued tax-backed paper money not directly 
linked to specie would likely have insulated and dampened the effects of international 
trade-flow specie shocks on the public.
35  Luther Martin (and in an odd way Gouvernuer 
Morris) probably saw the issue correctly (Farrand II, 307; III, 214-215).  
VIII. Epilogue 
  Today the U.S. has the same written Constitution in terms of monetary powers 




backed not by specie but only by federal government taxes, or the good faith and credit of 
the federal government—a government that also has power to institute price and 
exchange rate controls on said currency (Rockoff). This paper money is also a legal 
tender, with the legal tender clause “This note is legal tender for all debts, public and 
private” printed on each note. It is issued by the Federal Reserve Banking system that, 
while only a quasi-government agency in the strict legal sense, is about as close to a 
national banking system incorporated by the federal government as one can get. Unless 
we take the original intent of the founding fathers in their debates and votes at the 1787 
Convention on monetary/banking powers to be a devious ruse, then it is hard not to 
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1 From May 28th through September 17th the delegates met every day except Sundays. 
There was a brief adjournment on the 4th of July, from July 27th through August 5th 
while the Committee of Detail crafted a draft constitution, and on September 11th while 
the Committee on Style polished the draft (Farrand I, II). Not all States or delegates 
attended continuously, see Farrand (III, 557-559, 586-590). 
    
2 The “inside” versus “outside” money distinction is important. Outside money 
(specie) is that used to clear international (trans-government-jurisdictional) debts for both 
private and public trades. For a nation that did not produce specie, such as the U.S. in 
1787, to have its money supply be only outside money meant that specie had to be 
imported to serve as the domestic money supply, which only could be done by exporting 
goods to import this money, thus sacrificing the importation of other real goods. It also 
meant that the government had little direct influence over domestic monetary policy 
(other than regulatory powers over foreign trade), and that the economy was exposed to 
short-run swings in the availability of money (specie) caused by the exigencies of trade 
flows, wars, etc. These short-run swings could put severe pressure on domestic 
transactions, debt recovery, and tax revenues. The gain from using only outside money 
was that, in the long run, international markets would equilibrate. Specie would flow 
from where it was plentiful to where it was scarce, leading to a common long-run 
stability in price trends internationally (Redish 713-714). Long-run domestic inflation 
would be constrained to be similar to long-run inflation in the outside money 
internationally. By contrast, when an inside money (not directly linked to specie) is used 




                                                                                                                                                 
payments, it frees the outside money to buy imported real goods thus increasing social 
welfare (Pennsylvania Archives IV, 3284). It also increases the income (seignorage) of 
the government issuing the inside money—a non-inflationary substitute for direct tax 
revenue. The government would pay for goods with the initial issue of the inside money 
that would then circulate in society as currency, and/or loan out said money at interest to 
its citizens. Issuing an inside money also gave the government a short-run monetary 
policy instrument to counter swings in economic activity caused by the exigencies of 
trade flows, wars, and other international disruptions to the outside money supply. The 
government could issue more inside money than it taxed out of circulation or vice versa 
to counterbalance short-run swings in the availability of outside money (Ferguson 1983, 
399-400; Grubb 2003, 1780, 1792). Having an inside money also insulated purely 
domestic transactions, debt recovery, and tax payments from money scarcity caused by 
excessive short-run specie outflows due to short-run imbalances in trade flows. The 
market exchange rate between the inside and outside money, and thus the international 
merchant trading community as opposed to the whole society, would be forced to absorb 
the brunt of monetary shocks generated by the short-run imbalance in specie flows 
caused by the exigencies of trade, wars, etc. When only outside money is used, these 
short-run shocks are borne by the entire society and sometimes disproportionately by 
purely domestic traders. The cost of using an inside money is the temptation to engage in 
unanticipated inflationary finance by over-issuing it, thus inflating prices in the inside 
money faster than prices in the outside money and so (unexpectedly) driving the 
exchange rate between inside and outside money down. The typical causes are popular 




                                                                                                                                                 
taxes—and emergency expenditures such as during wars. The exchange rate between 
inside and outside money is the disciplining tool to restrain governments from excess 
inflationary finance. The legal tender issue (discussed later) becomes economically 
important when governments try to escape this discipline by legally mandating the 
exchange rate between the inside and outside money to be different from that determined 
by the market. For an up-to-date discussion for contemporary economies, see Feldstein 
(1-92). 
    
3 The only enumerated monetary power given Congress by the U.S. Constitution was 
the power to “coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin” [Article 1 
Section 8]. Congress could declare what its official monetary unit of account would be, as 
it did in July of 1785—well before the Constitutional Convention—when it declared the 
dollar to be the official unit of account for the national government. But Congress could 
not constitutionally force others engaged either in private or state transactions to use a 
specific monetary unit of account. State-chartered banks could have issued their 
banknotes in monetary units other than U.S. dollars. The Constitution’s prohibition on 
states issuing bills of credit and making anything other than gold and silver a legal tender 
would not necessarily force a common monetary unit of account on the country for it 
allowed any specie unit of account to be used in legal tender transactions. While the 
national government did mint U.S. dollar coins after 1792, foreign coins of various 
denominations—Spanish silver dollars, Spanish gold pistoles, Portuguese Johannes, 
English silver shillings, etc.—remained in circulation for some time, and nothing legally 
stopped people from selecting any of these other foreign specie denominations as a 




                                                                                                                                                 
would accept there was no necessary or legally forced common unit of account in the 
early Republic. Congress by act of February 9, 1793 made the gold coins of Great 
Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal and the silver coins of France and Spain a legal 
tender. This act was frequently renewed, e.g. in 1798, 1806, 1819, 1821, 1823, 1834, and 
1843. Not until the act of February 21, 1857 did Congress repeal all laws making foreign 
coins a legal tender in the United States (Muhleman 39).   
    
4 A common error repeated often in the literature is the claim that the Convention 
intentionally crafted a Constitution where Congress was allowed the power to emit bills 
of credit. For example, see Baack (653); Ferguson (1969, 254, 258); Nettels (98-99); 
Rolnick, Smith, and Weber (3); Schweitzer (311). The analysis here, if nothing else, is a 
valuable corrective in showing that under almost any logically consistent and coherent 
interpretation such a claim cannot be easily sustained. See also footnote 23.  
    
5 I will rely primarily on Convention records and supporting documents as compiled in 
Farrand (I, II, III), and on his interpretation of those records and documents. The most 
detailed records of the debates at the Convention are the notes taken by James Madison. 
These “…have remained the standard authority for the proceedings of the Convention” 
(Farrand I, xvi). As such, unless otherwise indicated, quotations of Convention debates 
are taken from Madison’s notes. At the Convention, votes on motions were recorded by 
state, not by individual delegate. Thus, when votes are reported in the text, e.g. 8 to 3 
against, they refer to the number of states on either side of the issue.  
    
6 Hamilton’s argument here is basically the same as that made by Charles Pinckney at 




                                                                                                                                                 
Constitution made by the Committee of Detail—only to be abandoned for more radical 
proscriptions, see Section II. B., and Section IV. below. 
    
7 On May 29th while taking notes on Randolph’s speech James McHenry of Maryland 
jotted down, “Congress ought to possess a power to prevent emissions of bills of credit” 
(Farrand I, 26). Was McHenry quoting Randolph’s speech or was this phrase simply 
McHenry’s own sentiment expressed in his notes? The evidence strongly points against 
the former and in favor of the latter interpretation. First, this phrase, or anything like it, 
does not appear in the Convention’s Journal or in the notes taken by Madison, or by 
Robert Yates (New York), or by William Patterson (New Jersey) for that day. Second, 
the phrase in question, or anything like it, does not appear in Randolph’s own text of the 
speech. Randolph provided the written text of his speech to Madison who substituted it in 
place of his notes on the speech (appearing in Randolph’s handwriting in Madison’s 
notes of the Convention for that day). Third, the phrase in question was jotted down by 
McHenry in an odd location, namely in the section where Randolph was talking about 
blessings that the National Congress could bestow on the union if only it was given its 
own power of taxation (as opposed to appearing in the section which addressed the 
disharmony and conflict among the States). Thus, one possible interpretation of 
McHenry’s phrasing is that, given its own power to tax, Congress would not have to 
resort to emissions of paper money as it did during the Revolution. In other words, 
McHenry simply deduced that Congress ought to possess the power to tax that in turn 
would mean that they would possess the power to prevent themselves from engaging in 
emissions of bills of credit. Finally, McHenry’s notes for other days frequently contain 




                                                                                                                                                 
among the delegates. Thus, another likely interpretation would be that the phrase in 
question was an expression of McHenry’s own personal desires. McHenry had recently 
sponsored a bill in the Maryland State Senate for establishing a bank. The Maryland 
House of Delegates had repeatedly blocked this bill. In its place the Maryland House of 
Delegates had passed a bill for a new emission of Maryland State paper money. In turn, 
the Maryland Senate had repeatedly blocked this paper money bill. McHenry may have 
seen a national congressional power to ban state paper money as the solution to this 
stalemate between the banking faction and the state paper-money faction that would 
allow his banking bill to succeed. See Bryan (17-19); Behrens (79-97); Grubb (2003, 
1788-1789). 
    
8 It should be noted that the New York State Assembly debated the same issue early in 
1787 regarding how the states would pay for Congress’ proposed Continental Impost 
(national tariff). If each state could pay the national government in its respective paper 
money at the face value of that money in specie, rather than at its market value in specie, 
then specie-value inequities in tax contributions would occur between states to the extent 
that state paper monies traded at different market values off their face value in specie. For 
example, in his address to the New York Assembly in February of 1787 Alexander 
Hamilton argued, “The paper money of the state of New-York, in most transactions is 
equal to gold and silver—that of Rhode-Island is depreciated to five for one—that of 
North-Carolina to two for one—that of South-Carolina may perhaps be worth fifteen 
shillings in the pound. If the states pay the duties in paper [at their face value and not 
their market value], is it not evident that for every pound of that duty consumed by the 




                                                                                                                                                 
would pay 15s. [shillings] of North-Carolina, 10s [shillings] and Rhode-Island, only four 
[shillings]!” (Syrett IV, 87). The source of Hamilton’s problem was binding legal tender 
laws and not the emission of paper money per se. 
    
9 On June 2nd during the debate over how to elect the national executive, Elbridge 
Gerry of Massachusetts also opined that “he thought the Community not yet ripe for 
stripping the States of their powers, even such as might not be requisite for local 
purposes” (Farrand I, 80).  
    
10 Randolph’s opening speech on May 29th only referred to the “havoc of paper 
money.” As such, it may have only been referring to the debacle of the national 
government’s paper Continental dollar.   
   
11 Hamilton’s notes for June 6th also mention paper money. His notes, however, are 
cryptic and lacking in context, and so their meaning is hard to interpret. He wrote, “Paper 
money is capable of giving a general impulse. It is easy to conceive a popular sentiment 
pervading the E states—” (Farrand I, 146-147). 
   
12 Among Sherman’s papers is a document outlining proposals for a plan of 
government which includes the following: “That the legislature of the individual states 
ought not to possess a right to emit bills of credit for a currency, or to make any tender 
laws for the payment or discharge of debts or contracts, in any manner different from the 
agreement of the parties, unless for payment of the value of the thing contracted for, in 
current money, agreeable to the standard that shall be allowed by the legislature of the 
United States, or in any manner to obstruct or impede the recovery of debts, whereby the 
interests of foreigners, or the citizens of any other states, may be affected” (Farrand III, 




                                                                                                                                                 
specific reference to it appears in the Convention debates. Farrand (III, 615) suggests that 
it represented the ideas of the Connecticut delegation in forming the New Jersey Plan. 
However, nothing like the above passage appears in the New Jersey Plan, and it was not 
among the documents referred to the Committee on Detail on July 26th.  
   
13 The reference here is to the paper money emitted by Rhode Island in 1786. A major 
complaint against this action by out-of-state creditors came when Rhode Island made this 
paper money a legal tender, because it meant that out-of-state creditors would have to 
accept Rhode Island paper money for payment of loans made within Rhode Island. The 
retaliation of which Madison speaks were laws passed by the Connecticut and 
Massachusetts legislatures that allowed their citizens, respectively, who owed debts to 
Rhode Island creditors to pay their debts in Rhode Island in Rhode Island paper money 
(Grubb 2003, 1782).  
   
14 Hamilton made almost the same confession in 1790 as Secretary of the Treasury in 
his Report on a National Bank in reference to the peacetime stability of state-issued paper 
money. He said, “The emitting of paper money by the authority of Government is wisely 
prohibited to the individual States, by the National Constitution. … In times of 
tranquility, it [state-issued paper money] might have no ill consequences, it might even 
perhaps be managed in a way to be productive of good; but in great and trying 
emergencies, there is almost a moral certainty of it becoming mischievous” (Freeman 
591-592). 
   
15 Luther Martin, Convention delegate from Maryland, made similar observations 




                                                                                                                                                 
   
16 See also footnote 4 above and footnote 25 below. McHenry’s notes for this day 
corroborate the Convention’s decision to strike the words “and emit bills” from the 
powers granted to the federal government (Farrand II, 311). Shortly after the Convention, 
at the South Carolina ratification debate, Pinckney said, “Besides, if paper should become 
necessary, the general government still possess the power of emitting it, and Continental 
paper, well funded, must ever answer the purpose better than state paper” (Elliot 335). 
While Pinckney did not speak on the day (August 16th) when the Convention voted to 
ban the national government from emitting bills of credit, he did speak on August 15th 
and again on August 17th and is thought to have been present on August 16th. And South 
Carolina was recorded as voting for this ban on August 16th (Farrand II, 298, 304-310, 
314; III, 589-590). Whether Pinckney had forgotten or was strategically lying is hard to 
say. Pinckney’s claim also illustrates the key problem with the Constitution’s 
construction that would prove so controversial regarding a national bank (see Section VI. 
B.). Powers explicitly voted not to be given the national government were not written in 
the Constitution. 
   
17 Absolutely prohibiting government-issued paper money in the Constitution was 
considered a high-risk, all-or-nothing, less-than-popular move. Those who most 
advocated it, such as Morris and Wilson, while not directly connecting it with the issue of 
how to get the Constitution ratified, took a position on ratification seemingly consistent 
with this high-risk strategy. For example, Wilson argued for approval of only 7 out of the 
13 states for the new Constitution to be adopted and put into operation in place of the 
Articles of Confederation. Considering that 6 of the 13 states had so far won the political 




                                                                                                                                                 
that anti-paper money forces had recently gained control of Pennsylvania’s political 
process, the number that Wilson advocated to achieve ratification is telling (Farrand II, 
468, 477, 562; Grubb 2003, 1790).  
   
18 Gouverneur Morris could have meant something like the personal notes issued by 
Robert Morris during the Revolution as Congress’ Superintendent of Finance. Given the 
close relationship between these notes and those soon issued by Robert Morris’ Bank of 
North America, the distinction is probably minor (Perkins 115-116). It is hard to conclude 
that Morris meant any other than the Bank of North America here by the term 
“responsible minister.” The only approximate national paper currency being issued 
between 1782 and 1787 were the banknotes of Morris’ Bank of North America. 
   
19 In a footnote to his notes on the Convention written sometime after the War of 1812 
Madison explained Virginia’s affirmative vote for Morris’ motion to delete “and emit 
bills on the credit of the United States” despite the objections raised by the Virginia 
delegates Randolph, Mason, and himself, as “This vote in the affirmative by Virga. Was 
occasioned by the acquiescence of Mr. Madison who became satisfied that striking out 
the words would not disable the Govt from the use of public notes as far as they could be 
safe & proper; & would only cut off the pretext for a paper currency and particularly for 
making the bills a tender either for public or private debts” (Farrand I, xv-xix; II, 310). 
This explanation may be a hindsight effort by Madison to cover himself for the problems 
he and the national government faced during his presidency in financing the War of 1812 
given no constitutional power to emit bills of credit and given that the charter of the First 




                                                                                                                                                 
   
20 On August 28th Pinckney moved again to add the power to the national legislature to 
negate all state laws interfering with the harmony of the union. This power had already 
been defeated by the Convention on July 17th and would not be adopted at this time 
either (Farrand II, 27-28, 382, 390-392). Because the draft constitution submitted by the 
Committee of Detail already explicitly gave the national legislature the power to negate 
state emissions of paper money, giving the national legislature a general negative over 
state laws is not relevant to the issue of monetary powers here as it was before August 
6th. But Pinckney’s move here does indicate that the prior demand for a general negative 
over state laws was not just a disguised demand for a negative over state-issued paper 
money.  
   
21 An interesting question is whether the order of the vote mattered to the outcome in 
an agenda control interpretation. The vote on whether to absolutely prohibit state bills of 
credit was taken first and then the vote on whether to prohibit making anything but gold 
and silver legal tender was taken second. Given some doubt about the outcome of the 
second vote, a delegate may have been induced to vote in favor of absolute prohibition on 
the first vote. By contrast, had the second vote been taken first with the same outcome so 
that all the delegates knew that states could not make their paper money a legal tender, 
then the outcome of the (now) second vote on whether to absolutely prohibit state bills of 
credit might have been different, in effect being only a vote over allowing a non-legal 
tender paper money as opposed to the original vote which was over allowing paper 
money in general.        
   
22 During the South Carolina’s ratification debate, Pinckney argued (Elliot 333-336), 




                                                                                                                                                 
soul of the Constitution,… The only parts of this section that are objected to are those 
which relate to the emission of paper money, and its consequence, tender-laws, and the 
impairing the obligation of contract.” He then goes on for several pages defending the 
Constitution’s absolute ban on state paper money. Apparently, Pinckney expected the 
strongest opposition to ratification to come from this single clause. During the ratification 
debates, Martin objected strenuously to the absolute ban on state paper money, claiming 
that it was because the Convention was “…smitten with the paper money dread,…” 
Martin “considered that this State [Maryland], and some others, had formerly received 
great benefit from paper emissions,…[that] such emissions might hereafter be equally 
advantageous; and further, that it is impossible to foresee, that events may not take place, 
which shall render paper money of absolute necessity…”  (Farrand III, 214-215). Finally, 
Main (1961, pp. 268-279) argued that many Americans, maybe even a majority, were on 
the side of paper money and unhappy with the Constitution over absolutely banning its 
emission (see also Holton 2005a, 198):  
This thesis….stressed the correlation between Antifederalism and paper money… 
This interpretation has much truth. … It is also true…that paper money was a 
factor in the [ratification] contest. In Massachusetts, towns opposing paper were 
Federal by about four to one, while pro-paper money towns were Antifederal by 
an even wider margin. [footnote 58: Pro-paper money towns cast only 3 votes for 
and 22 votes against ratification; anti-paper money towns favored ratification 29 
to 7.] The hard (or less soft) money towns in New Hampshire were Federal; most 
of the Antifederal strength in Connecticut was found in paper money districts; and 
the case of Rhode Island is sufficiently familiar. … In Maryland and Virginia the 
paper money forces opposed ratification. This was also the case in North 
Carolina, while in South Carolina, Antifederal strength lay in the backcountry, 
which had favored inflation. … All the foregoing does not prove an exact 
correlation… There are…exceptions… Leaving aside the fact that many 
Antifederalist, especially the leaders, specifically denounced state currency 
emissions, we have to consider the following exceptions: (1) in South Carolina, a 
large number of planters, most of whom became Federalist, supported paper 




                                                                                                                                                 
in Pennsylvania, although it is probable that a majority of the people were 
Federal, a majority favored paper money… That paper money sentiment was in 
some degree a factor in the existence of Antifederalism is scarcely to be 
doubted—the Antifederalists drew more heavily by far than their opponents from 
the ranks of paper money advocates… 
  
   
23 This interpretation was restated explicitly in the 10th Amendment to the Constitution 
adopted in 1791. By contrast, and in direct contradiction to the 10th Amendment, some 
scholars often assert that the federal government can do anything it wants under the 
Constitution as long as the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit it (the modern 
Federalist view?). This interpretation renders Article 1 Section 8 of the Constitution 
superfluous and nonsensical. It makes many of the debates and votes at the Constitutional 
Convention equally superfluous and nonsensical, such as the debate and decision to state 
specifically in the Constitution that Congress has the explicit positive power to establish 
post offices but voting not to state specifically that Congress has the explicit power to 
establish a university (Farrand II, 611, 616, 620).   
   
24 For example, the Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power to establish post 
offices and post roads. If the founding fathers had considered that the power to establish 
post offices implied the power to establish post roads to carry the mail between post 
offices, then no separate granting of power to establish post roads would have been 
required in the Constitution. Explicitly enumerating such a power separately implies that 
the founding fathers did not consider that the power to establish post roads was implied 
by the power to establish post offices. The logic of such comparisons circumscribes the 
implied powers clause in Article 1 Section 8. As such, the power to establish post offices 
would not imply that Congress also has the power to go into the business of breeding 




                                                                                                                                                 
   
25 Scholars have often been deflected by this implied-powers argument for federal 
power both to issue bills of credit and to charter banks without considering what was 
meant by explicit Convention votes not to grant the federal government these powers. For 
example, see Nettels (99).  
   
26 “ca” can be an abbreviation for “chartered accountancy,” but how that applies here is 
unclear.   
   
27 The following is Madison’s description of how he took notes at the Convention: “I 
chose a seat in front of the presiding member, with the other members, on my right and 
left hand. In this favorable position for hearing all that passed I noted in terms legible and 
in abbreviations and marks intelligible to myself what was read from the Chair or spoken 
by the members; and losing not a moment unnecessarily between the adjournment and 
reassembling of the Convention I was enabled to write out my daily notes during the 
session or within a few finishing days after it closed” (Farrand I, xvi). 
   
28 Because New York did not vote at the Convention after July 10th, Hamilton may not 
have paid close attention to specific debates even when he was in attendance. Robert 
Yates and John Lansing, the other delegates from New York, left the Convention by July 
10th and did not return (Farrand). 
   
29 Hamilton’s role here is difficult to fathom, in particular his silence during the 
Convention on the issue of banks, especially on the crucial day in question—September 
14th. None of Hamilton’s recorded statements at the Convention, including his plan of 
government, mention banks (Farrand). However, before the Convention, Hamilton had 
long advocated that the national government be given the power to charter banks 




                                                                                                                                                 
Hamilton was the chief proponent of Congress’ right to charter a national bank (Freeman 
575-646). Reconciling Hamilton’s very active argumentation and pursuit of a national 
bank both before and after the Convention with his silence during the Convention is hard 
to do without regarding Hamilton as being strategically cunning and deceptive (Ferguson 
1983, 404-405; Grubb 2003, 1791). Perhaps Hamilton considered banking so 
controversial an issue that any positive mention might excite too much opposition at the 
Convention—killing the Constitution’s chances of ratification. Perhaps Hamilton thought 
if he “played possum” he could get his way no matter what the Convention intended as 
long as the Convention did not absolutely ban national banking by written clause in the 
Constitution. 
   
30 In a letter to Madison, dated June 20, 1791, George Nicholas concluded, “The Bank 
&c. [First Bank of the U.S.] prove that paper barriers [the U.S. Constitution] are very 
weak; could it have been foreseen that no greater regard would have been paid them 
many federalists would have been the warmest opposers of the government” (Rutland 
XIV, 33). 
   
31 Ferguson (1969, 1983) emphasizes the federal debt as the driving force behind the 
constitutional agenda of the nationalists. The debt problem, however, was solved by 
giving the federal government the independent power to tax and by the transfer of state 
lands claimed in the west to the federal government—moving the federal government 
toward a solvent position asset-wise. With the exception of legal tender restrictions, paper 
money and banks were separable issues to funding the debt and so funding the federal 
debt cannot explain the particular monetary powers chosen to be in the Constitution.  
   




                                                                                                                                                 
And why can we not have an American bank? Are our monied men less 
enlightened to their own interest or less enterprising in the persuit? I believe the 
fault is in our government which does not exert itself to engage them in such a 
scheme. … The only certain manner to obtain a permanent paper credit is to 
engage the monied interest immediately in it by making them contribute the 
whole or part of the stock and giving them the whole or part of the profits 
(Freeman 83-84). 
 
See also the letter from William Bingham, a director of the Bank of North America, to 
Hamilton on November 25, 1789, where he advises Hamilton to establish a national bank, 
that such a bank would receive “great Benefit & Emolument” from this situation, and that 
the Bank of North America would be a good candidate for being the national bank (Syrett 
V, 538-554). 
   
33 For example, during the South Carolina ratification debates, Pinckney referred to 
“…the emission of paper money and its consequences, tender-laws, and the impairing the 
obligation of contracts” (Elliot 334 [italics added]). 
   
34 For example, Pinckney’s argument for constitutionally banning paper money made 
during South Carolina’s ratification debates is consistent with this position (Elliot 334). 
   
35 For an up-to-date discussion of these issues for contemporary economies, see 
Feldstein (1-92). 
   
36 In the 19th century, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that under the “Necessary and 
Proper” clause [the implied–powers clause] of the Constitution the federal government 
had the power to emit bills of credit and to incorporate a national bank, these powers 
being implied by other enumerated powers granted Congress (Warren 696, 700-701). 
Whether the Supreme Court determined that the “Necessary and Proper” clause trumped 




                                                                                                                                                 
they just redefined “Necessary and Proper” to be “Expedient and Desirous” is a story for 
another day. 